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This thesis consists of two parts. The rst part uses Gaussian Copula and
Student's t Copula as the main tools to model the credit risk in securitizations
and re-securitizations. The second part proposes a statistical procedure to identify
changepoints in Cox model of survival data.
The recent 2007-2009 nancial crisis has been regarded as the worst nancial
crisis since the Great Depression by leading economists. The securitization sector
took a lot of blame for the crisis because of the connection of the securitized products
created from mortgages to the collapse of the housing market. The rst part of
this thesis explores the relationship between securitized mortgage products and the
2007-2009 nancial crisis using the Copula method as the main tool. We show
in this part how loss distributions of securitizations and re-securitizations can be
derived or calculated in a new model. Simulations are conducted to examine the
eectiveness of the model. As an application, the model is also used to examine
whether and where the ratings of securitized products could be awed.
On the other hand, the lag eect and saturation eect problems are common
and important problems in survival data analysis. They belong to a general class
of problems where the treatment eect takes occasional jumps instead of staying
constant throughout time. Therefore, they are essentially the changepoint prob-
lems in statistics. The second part of this thesis focuses on extending Lai and
Xing's recent work in changepoint modeling, which was developed under a time
series and Bayesian setup, to the lag eect problems in survival data. A general
changepoint approach for Cox model is developed. Simulations and real data anal-
yses are conducted to illustrate the eectiveness of the procedure and how it should
be implemented and interpreted.
Contents
List of Tables iv
List of Figures vi
Acknowledgments vii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Credit Risk Modeling and Analysis Using Copula Method . . . . . . 1
1.2 Changepoint Approach to Survival Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 2 Credit Risk Modeling and Analysis Using Copula Method 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Securitization and Re-securitization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.2 Economic Capital and Loss Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3 Valuation vs. Credit Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
i
2.2.1 Asymptotic Single Risk Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Pykhtin-Dev Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Credit Risk Model for Re-securitizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Some Qualitative Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.4 Application: Are the AAA Ratings Justied? . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.5 Derivation of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Modeling Credit Risk in Securitizations Using Student's t Copula . 59
2.4.1 A Review of Copula Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.2 Connection of ASRF to Gaussian Copula . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4.3 Motivation for Using an Alternative Copula . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4.4 The Student's t Copula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4.5 Multivariate t Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4.6 Securitization Model with Student's t Copula . . . . . . . . 67
2.4.7 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chapter 3 Changepoint Approach to Survival Data 72
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1.1 Survival Analysis and Survival Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1.2 Cox Model and Partial Likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
ii
3.1.3 Lag Eect and Changepoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.1.4 Changepoint Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2 Model Specication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.1 Changepoint Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.2 Cox Model with Changepoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.2.3 Estimation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.3 Proof of Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.1 Single Changepoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.4 Simulation Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.4.1 Fixed Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.4.2 One Changepoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4.3 Two Changepoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.4.4 A Study of Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.5 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Chapter 4 Discussion 127
4.1 Credit Risk Modeling and Analysis Using Copula Method . . . . . . 127




2.1 Moody's recovery rates on corporate bonds, 1982-2003. . . . . . . . 24
2.2 EL and LCL with K = 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 CDO Tranche 15% - 50% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4 EL and UL of RMBS and CDO tranches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5 EL and UL of RMBS and CDO tranches (continued) . . . . . . . . 51
2.6 Student's t Copula with dierent degrees of freedom . . . . . . . . . 69
3.1 One changepoint with Bernoulli covariate, xed segmentation. . . . 106
3.2 One changepoint with normal covariate, xed segmentation. . . . . 107
3.3 One changepoint with Bernoulli covariate, natural segmentation. . . 109
3.4 One changepoint with normal covariate, natural segmentation. . . . 111
3.5 Varying changepoint locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.6 Varying degrees of censoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.7 Varying scales of change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.8 One changepoint with number of changepoint unknown. . . . . . . . 115
iv
3.9 Zero changepoint with number of changepoint unknown. . . . . . . 116
3.10 Two changepoints with number of changepoint known (a). . . . . . 118
3.11 Two changepoints with number of changepoint known (b). . . . . . 118
3.12 Two changepoints with number of changepoint unknown (a). . . . . 119
3.13 Two changepoints with number of changepoint unknown (b). . . . . 120
3.14 Treatment eect continuous change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
v
List of Figures
2.1 Securitization and re-securitization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Granularity adjustments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3 Amount of support needed to make the top RMBS tranche `AAA' . 53
2.4 EL and LCL under dierent degrees of freedom . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.1 Treatment eect steep change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.2 Treatment eect gradual change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.3 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.4 Changepoint procedure estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.5 MLE procedure estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
vi
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my deepest gratitude toward my Ph.D advisor, Professor
Zhiliang Ying, from whom I have received so much advice, constant support, and
constructive criticism on research. I would like to thank Professor Haipeng Xing for
his kind help on the changepoint model, and thank Professor Tian Zheng, Victor
de la Pena, Quanshui Zhao, and Yixin Fang for their insightful comments.
In addition, I am deeply thankful to my parents, whose love has supported me
during my life in the States. I would like to give special thanks to my wife, Yi-
Hsuan Lee, without whose patience and encouragement I would not have been able






This thesis consists of two parts. The rst part utilizes Gaussian Copula and
Student's t Copula to model the credit risk in securitizations and re-securitizations.
The second part proposes a statistical procedure to identify changepoints in Cox
model of survival data.
1.1 Credit Risk Modeling and Analysis Using Cop-
ula Method
The nancial crisis of 2007-2009 has been regarded as the worst nancial crisis
since the Great Depression by leading economists. During a two-year span, we
have witnessed the whole US nancial system and all the institutions going through
extraordinary changes. In 2009 alone, 140 banks failed, compared to a total of 3
2failures from 2005 to 2007. The crisis also saw millions of home owners losing their
houses to foreclosures. The majority of these mortgages are so-called subprime or
Alt-A, since the borrowers tend to be of lesser credit worthiness as opposed to prime
borrowers. Therefore, the 2007-2009 crisis is often referred to as the `subprime crisis'
as well.
The securitization sector in the nancial industry took a lot of blame during and
after the subprime crisis and credit crunch. This sector is very closely connected to
mortgages because of the enormous number of securitizations and re-securitizations
created from residential mortgages before and during the crisis. These securities,
often referred to as residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateral-
ized debt obligations (CDO) backed by RMBS tranches, were in the center of this
turmoil and were direct or indirect causes of many of the bank failures. They relate
to plenty of factors that are generally deemed to have contributed to the crisis, e.g.,
subprime lending, housing bubble, complexity and lack of transparency of nancial
products, incompetence of credit ratings, misuse or misunderstanding of profound
mathematical models, etc.
The rst part of this thesis is largely an eort to explore the relationship between
these securitized products and the subprime crisis using Copula method as the
main tool, attempting to answer the questions of what kind of role they played
in the crisis. We show in this part how loss distributions of securitizations and
re-securitizations can be derived or calculated in a new model. As an application,
3the model is also used to examine whether and where the ratings of securitized
products could be awed.
1.2 Changepoint Approach to Survival Data
Cox model is the most widely used regression model in survival data analysis.
It models failure time by decomposing the hazard rate function into two parts:
the baseline hazard function, describing how hazard (risk) changes over time at
`baseline' levels of covariates; and the eect parameters, describing how the hazard
varies in response to explanatory covariates.
In survival analysis, it is often not unreasonable to assume that a treatment
does not start to aect the risk of failure until after a certain time lag, which can
be called \lag eect". There is also the possibility of a \saturation eect", where
the treatment stops to aect the risk of failure after a certain period of time. In
the terms of Cox model, these situations are equivalent to a time-varying covariate
eect parameter, staying at a constant value for a period of time and then taking a
jump to a new value. The statistical problem of identifying the location of jumps
falls into a general class of problems called changepoint problems.
Changepoint problems have been studied in the statistical literature since the
1970s, and most recently by Lai and Xing (2011). The second part of this thesis
extends Lai and Xing's changepoint method to the lag eect problem of survival
4data and develops a changepoint procedure for Cox model. Simulations and real
data analyses are conducted to illustrate the eectiveness of the procedure and how
it should be implemented and interpreted.
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Credit Risk Modeling and
Analysis Using Copula Method
2.1 Introduction
The nancial crisis of 2007-2009 has been regarded as the worst nancial crisis
since the Great Depression by some leading economists. During a two-year span,
we have witnessed the whole US nancial system and all the institutions going
through extraordinary changes.
In March 2008, the concerns that investment bank Bear Stearns would collapse
resulted in its re-sale to JP Morgan Chase. The crisis hit its peak in September
and October 2008. Several major institutions either failed, were acquired under
duress, or were subject to government takeover. These included Lehman Brothers,
6Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG. The receivership of Washington
Mutual Bank by federal regulators on September 26, 2008, was the largest bank
failure in U.S. history. Twenty-ve banks in the United States failed and were
taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 2008, after
only three failures in 2007 and none in 2006 or 2005. According to CNN, 140 more
banks failed in 2009, causing the FDIC's deposit insurance fund to slip into the
red for the rst time since 1991. In a dramatic meeting on September 18, 2008,
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke met with key
legislators to propose a $700 billion emergency bailout.
The US economic and nancial system underwent a huge contraction period
during the crisis. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Gross Do-
mestic Product, the output of goods and services produced by labor and property
located in the United States, decreased at an annual rate of approximately 6 per-
cent in the fourth quarter of 2008 and rst quarter of 2009, versus activity in the
year-ago periods. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate increased to 9.8% by September 2009, the highest rate since 1983 and
roughly twice the pre-crisis rate. The average hours per work week declined to 33,
the lowest level since the government began collecting the data in 1964.
Roger Altman (2009), who was U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary in 1993-94,
wrote that \the crash of 2008 has inicted profound damage on the US nan-
cial system, its economy, and its standing in the world; the crisis is an important
7geopolitical setback...the crisis has coincided with historical forces that were already
shifting the world's focus away from the United States. Over the medium term, the
United States will have to operate from a smaller global platform|while others,
especially China, will have a chance to rise faster."
Since the start of the crisis, economists and nancial researchers have been re-
ecting and contemplating, trying to gure out the real cause of the crisis behind
the scenes. Most people tend to agree that the dramatic rise in mortgage delin-
quencies and foreclosures was the fuse that set o most of the events afterwards.
That is why this past crisis is also referred to as the `subprime crisis', since most
of the delinquencies came from subprime and Alt-A mortgages, which are typically
of lesser credit worthiness as opposed to prime mortgages.
The securitization sector in the nancial industry took a lot of blame during the
subprime crisis and credit crunch. This sector is very closely connected to mortgages
because of the enormous number of securitizations and re-securitizations created
from residential mortgages before and during the crisis. These securities, often re-
ferred to as residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt
obligations (CDO) backed by RMBS tranches, were in the center of this turmoil
and were direct or indirect causes of many of the bank failures. They relate to
plenty of factors that generally deemed to have contributed to the crisis, e.g., sub-
prime lending, housing bubble, complexity and lack of transparency of nancial
products, incompetence of credit ratings, misuse or misunderstanding of profound
8mathematical models, etc.
This part of the thesis is largely an eort to explore the relationship between
these securitized products and the subprime crisis through a mathematical way,
attempting to answer the questions of what kind of role they played in this crisis.
2.1.1 Securitization and Re-securitization
The nancial product of main interest in this thesis will be the so-called `struc-
tured products', namely `securitizations' and `re-securitizations'. They got this
name because they are usually structured and `tranched' in such a way that will
give investors dierent choices for risk and return prole.
As illustrated by Figure 2.1, the typical practice of structuring a re-securitization
deal is as follows: rstly, thousands of mortgages (often times of subprime quality)
are gathered into one portfolio and securitized. The deal is sliced into multiple
tranches which, with dierent risk and return prole, would cater to the needs of
dierent investors. The top tranche (usually called super-senior or senior tranche),
which is of the highest quality and lowest risk, will often be bought by big insti-
tutions like insurance companies. The middle tranches (usually called mezzanine
tranches) are more risky but generate bigger returns. The lowest tranche is usually
called `equity' tranche for the similarity of its position in a liability structure to a
stock. Equity tranches are very risky and are usually sold to hedge funds that seek
high returns. This rst process is called `securitization'. The end product is called
9`RMBS' in this case.
The second step, called `re-securitization', involves securitizing tens or hun-
dreds of these RMBS tranches (usually mezzanine tranches or subordinate senior
tranches) again. This portfolio of RMBS tranches is also sliced into senior, mez-
zanine and equity tranches and sold to various investors. This kind of product is
called a `CDO of RMBS'.
There is about $14.6 trillion in total U.S. mortgage debt outstanding. There
are about $8.9 trillion in total U.S. mortgage-related securities. Mortgage-backed
securities can be considered to have been in the tens of trillions, if `Credit De-
fault Swaps' (CDSs) are taken into account. (`Credit Default Swaps' are synthetic
instruments that reference a tranche of a securitization or re-securitization.)
In general, securitizations and re-securitizations do not have to be structured
from mortgages only. As a matter of fact, people construct them from student
loans, car loans, corporate loans, etc. in practice. These products may dier in
certain deal specics from mortgage securities, but the overall ideas of tranching
and risk/return tradeo remain exactly the same.
2.1.2 Economic Capital and Loss Distribution
In nance, mainly for banks and other nancial services rms, economic capital
is the amount of risk capital, assessed on a realistic basis, which a rm requires
to cover the risks of the businesses that it is running as a going concern, such as
10
Figure 2.1: Securitization and re-securitization
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market risk, credit risk, and operational risk. It is the amount of money which
is needed to secure survival in a worst case scenario. Firms and nancial services
regulators should then aim to hold risk capital of an amount equal to or above
economic capital.
Dev (2004) introduced the concept of economic capital as follows:
\Economic capital is a measure of risk. It is a single measure that captures the
unexpected losses and reduction in value or income from a portfolio or business
in a nancial institution. The risk arises from the unexpected nature of the losses
as distinct from expected losses, which are considered part of doing business and
are covered by reserves and income. Economic capital covers all unexpected events
except the catastrophic ones, for which it is impossible to hold capital. Economic
capital is a common currency in which all risks of a nancial institution can be mea-
sured, enabling comparison of risk across dierent risks, across diverse businesses
and across dierent nancial institutions."
Formally, economic capital is often calculated by determining the amount of
money that the rm needs to ensure that its balance sheet stays solvent over a cer-
tain time period (i.e., the time period is usually one year if not specied otherwise)
with a pre-specied probability. Therefore, economic capital is often calculated as
`value at risk'. In the area of credit risk, economic capital or simply capital, is
usually calculated from the quantiles of the loss distribution of an instrument or a
portfolio of instruments.
12
The concept of economic capital diers from regulatory capital in the sense that
regulatory capital is the mandatory capital the regulators require to be maintained
while economic capital is the best estimate of required capital that nancial institu-
tions use internally to manage their own risk and to allocate the cost of maintaining
regulatory capital among dierent units within the organizations.
This thesis will mainly deal with the problem of how to calculate capital for
securitizations and re-securitizations. There have been a lot of studies both in
academics and in industry on the loss distribution of a credit portfolio and on the
loss distribution of a securitization tranche supported by a credit portfolio, since
securitizations like RMBS have existed in the U.S. since 1970. However, a lot of re-
securitization deals came onto the scene only after 2000. They are more complicated
deals than securitizations, and they are quite dierent from securitizations in a few
very important aspects. Regrettably, a lot of people in the industry did not realize
or put enough emphasis on those dierences, which leads to them buying a lot
of re-securitization products (e.g., CDO tranches) without fully understanding the
risk that accompanies these products.
What compounded the problem was, at least as it appeared throughout the
crisis, that the rating agencies that rate these products (e.g., S&P, Moody's, Fitch)
did not model the re-securitization products accurately enough. However, a lot of
investors were very much dependent on these agency ratings. Since they do not
analyze the risk prole of the products themselves, they depend on the ratings to
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judge the riskiness of these products. A lot of them were under the `illusion' that
a corporate bond, an RMBS tranche and a CDO tranche have exactly the same
risk if they have the same ratings. Of course, as it turned out, this is totally a
misconception if not more. See, for example, Hull and White (2010).
On the other hand, the Basel II accord, which most regulatory capital require-
ments are based upon in the U.S. and Europe, did not dierentiate capital re-
quirements of securitizations from those of re-securitizations until recently. See
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) for more details. Additionally,
the capital requirements in Basel II are largely tied to agency ratings as well. Ret-
rospectively, the inadequate amount of capital kept by some nancial institutions
contributed to their downfall as well.
2.1.3 Valuation vs. Credit Models
The typical `wall-street' approach toward the structured products has been by
copula-based simulations, which could capture to some degree the correlation be-
tween dierent obligors and the complicated priority of payments (also called `wa-
terfall') in those securitization products. This approach is relatively accurate be-
cause of the incorporation of deal by deal specics, but as most Monte Carlo sim-
ulation methods it is rather time-consuming. These products were very actively
traded before the crisis, so the main objective of the people running this type of
model is to get an accurate valuation or pricing. The simulation approach is appro-
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priate for this purpose to calibrate the model to market prices down to nickels and
dimes. Refer to Li (2000) and Hull and White (2010) for discussions of copula-based
simulation models.
However, for the purpose of setting capital requirements of hundreds or thou-
sands of securitization and re-securitization tranches that a large bank or insur-
ance company hold, the simulation approach is not ideal because of its time-
consumingness. One is more concerned about the possible extreme credit losses
on the portfolio than whether the portfolio is worth 95 cents on a dollar or 96
cents. It is even a heavier computational burden if one needs to get an accurate
estimate of a high quantile of the loss distribution. That is why a credit model with
a simplied, fast and analytical or at least half analytical approach would be more
desirable. Such a methodology would help setting and benchmarking regulatory
capital standards as well.
Of course, an analytical model will not be able to incorporate details of each
deal's waterfall, or other factors such as prepayment risk, or interest rate term
structure, but with loss as the main focus, the strengths of such a model still
outweighs the weaknesses.
The above facts clearly suggest the need for an analytical model that describes
the loss distribution of a re-securitization tranche and from which people can get
quantiles rather eciently. We already have something to build upon, which is the
Pykhtin-Dev model (Pykhtin & Dev, 2002b) in the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor
15
(ASRF) framework.
ASRF is a large array of models dened by Gordy (2003), which has desirable
properties in terms of portfolio loss distribution. Pykhtin and Dev (2002b) proposed
a specic model in this category that has close ties with the Gaussian Copula model
in order to calculate the loss distribution and capital of securitizations.
In the rst part of this chapter, we will extend the Pykhtin-Dev model to re-
securitizations and show how to calculate analytically the loss distribution and
capital of a re-securitization tranche. In the second part, we will rst generalize
the correlation structure in Pykhtin-Dev Model from Gaussian Copula to Student's
t Copula for the purpose of incorporating higher tail risk and tail dependence,
and then propose a semi-analytical approach to calculate the loss distribution and
capital of a securitization tranche in the new model. Both of the new models will
be in the ASRF framework.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Asymptotic Single Risk Factor Models
In his 2003 foundational paper, Gordy dened a category of portfolio credit
risk models: the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model. These models are
simple yet powerful tools for analyzing credit risk in portfolios and securitizations.
A number of popular credit risk models belong to this category, e.g. the Pykhtin-
16
Dev model proposed in Pykhtin and Dev (2002b), which the Basel II rating-based
approach of capital requirement is based on.
The ASRF model is attractive mainly because of its very desirable asymptotic
properties. Some of the important properties are cited below from Gordy (2003)
to help develop results in the following sections.
For a portfolio of n obligors, dene the portfolio loss ratio Ln as the ratio of









where Ai is the exposure to obligor i, which is known and non-stochastic; Ui is the
random variable that denotes loss per dollar exposure. In the event of survival,
Ui = 0. Otherwise, Ui is the percentage loss-given-default (LGD) on instrument i.
For a given q 2 (0; 1), value-at-risk (VaR) is dened as the qth quantile of the loss
distribution, and is denoted VaRq[Ln]. Let q(Y ) denote the qth quantile of the
distribution of random variable Y , hence, VaRq[Ln] = q(Ln).
Let X denote the systematic risk factors of the portfolio, which are drawn from
a known joint distribution. It is assumed that all dependence across credit events is
due to common sensitivity to these factors. Conditional on X, the remaining credit
risk of the portfolio is idiosyncratic to the individual obligors in the portfolio.
In general, X can be multi-dimensional or uni-dimensional. Multi-dimensional
X probably makes more intuitive sense because one can usually think of multiple
17
dimensions of systematic factors in a (mortgage) portfolio. Geography, maturity,
and xed rate vs. adjustable rate are all possible dimensions. However, a uni-
dimensional systematic factor oers a great advantage in calculating the loss dis-
tribution and capital, as we will see later. Even very simplistic multi risk factor
models are usually reliant on computationally intensive simulation methods, while
single risk factor models can have elegant analytical solutions. There are method-
ologies that approximate a multi-risk factor model by a single risk factor model (and
an adjustment term), which in essence resembles the principal component method.
Please refer to Pykhtin (2004) for an introduction to multi-risk factor models. In
this thesis, we will focus on single risk factor models.
Formally, we will assume that
(A-1) the fUig are bounded in the interval [ 1; 1] and, conditional on X, are
mutually independent.
(A-2) the Ai are a sequence of positive constants such that
(a)
Pn
i=1Ai " 1 and




The restrictions in (A-2) are sucient to guarantee that the share of the largest
single exposure in total portfolio exposure vanishes to zero as the number of ex-
posures in the portfolio increases. As a practical matter, the restrictions are quite
18
weak and would be satised by any conceivable real-world portfolio. Gordy (2003)
proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If (A-1) and (A-2) hold, then, conditional on X = x, Ln E[Lnjx]!
0, almost surely.
In intuitive terms, Theorem 1 says that as the exposure share of each asset
in the portfolio goes to zero, idiosyncratic risk in portfolio loss is diversied away
perfectly. In the limit, the loss ratio converges to a xed function of the system-
atic factor X. We refer to this limiting portfolio as \innitely ne-grained" or as
an \asymptotic portfolio." An implication is that, in the limit, we only need to
know the conditional distribution of E[LnjX] to answer any questions about the
unconditional distribution of Ln.
Let Fn denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Ln. The second
theorem proved by Gordy (2003) can be described as follows.




! [q; 1]; Fn q(E[LnjX])  ! [0; q]: (2.2)
The importance of Theorem 2 is that it allows us to substitue the quantiles of
E[LnjX] (which often times are easier to calculate) for the corresponding quantiles
of the loss ratio Ln (which are usually dicult to calculate) as the portfolio becomes
large.
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Furthermore, the quantiles of E[LnjX] take on a particularly simple and desir-
able asymptotic form when we impose two additional restrictions:
(A-3) the systematic risk factor X is one-dimensional; and
(A-4) E[Uijx] are nondecreasing in x for all i.
If we dene








the third theorem proven in Gordy (2003) is stated as follows.
Theorem 3. If (A-3) and (A-4) are satised, then q(E[LnjX]) = E[Lnjq(X)] =
Mn(q(X)).
The importance of this result lies in the linearity of the expectation operator.
Whereas q(E[LnjX]) may, in the general case, be highly complicated, E[Lnjq(X)]
is simply the exposure-weighted average of the individual assets' conditional ex-
pected losses. Taken together with Theorems 1 and 2, Theorem 3 permits a simple
and powerful rule for determining capital requirements. For asset i, allocate cap-
ital per dollar book value (inclusive of expected loss) of ci  E[Uijq(X)] + , for
some arbitrarily small . Observe that this capital charge depends only on the
characteristics of instrument i and thus this rule is portfolio-invariant.
Models that satisfy all the assumptions (A-1) to (A-4), thus having the proper-
ties in Theorems 1, 2 and 3, are usually referred to as the Asymptotic Single Risk
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Factor (ASRF) model.
Please refer to Gordy (2003) for proofs and details of the Theorems.
2.2.2 Pykhtin-Dev Model
Pykhtin and Dev (2002a) developed an analytical model to calculate the loss
distribution and economic capital of securitizations under the ASRF framework.
Because of the close connection of their model to our main model of this chapter,
The detailed discussion of the Pykhtin-Dev model will be in Section 2.3.3.1.
2.3 Credit Risk Model for Re-securitizations
2.3.1 Introduction
In the nancial turmoil that started in the latter half of 2007, clearly a dis-
proportionate role has been played by the billions of dollars of marked-to-market
losses suered by nancial institutions on Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)
created out of tranches of Residential Mortgage-backed Securities (RMBS), which
in turn were created from subprime and Alt-A mortgages. Such CDOs may be
cash CDOs or synthetic CDOs (Credit Default Swaps written with a super-senior
tranche of a CDO of RMBS as reference entity).
CDO of RMBS is a special case of recent types of structured credit products
known as `re-securitization'. The average investor has always been cognizant of
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the fact that a re-securitization like a CDO of RMBS is more complex and less
transparent than a securitization like RMBS. Yet the average investor has also
been content with the rating. After all, both the senior-most tranches of a CDO of
RMBS and of a RMBS are rated AAA.
But it is not enough to talk about complexity and transparency in order to have
a good understanding of the relative risks of an investment in AAA CDO of RMBS
tranche and of an investment in AAA RMBS tranche. The fact that both of them
are AAA-rated seems to indicate, at a rst glance, that the credit risk in the two
types of securities must be rather similar; especially if the structures (securitization
and re-securitization) are created out of the same pool of underlying mortgages. In
this paper, we show that this statement is not necessarily true.
It has progressively become clear over time that there has been rather an al-
most complete lack of understanding of the credit risk in re-securitizations such
as CDO of RMBS, particularly tail risk measures. The Basel Committee has re-
cently published a proposal revamping the capital adequacy rules for securitiza-
tion. The proposal contains dierent sets of capital factors for securitization and
re-securitization (BCBS, 2009), making a clear distinction between securitization
and re-securitization.
Yet there is very little in the published credit risk literature that models credit
risk in re-securitization explicitly and that is distinct from credit risk in securitiza-
tion. All the improvements suggested in the ratings of structured credit products
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by the rating agencies have been mostly ad-hoc and in any case do not address this
basic distinction.
In this section we develop a complete model for credit risk in re-securitizations.
The model applies to all re-securitizations which are created from primitive as-
sets that are highly diversied. However, for presentation conciseness, we focus
specically on mortgage-related re-securitizations namely, CDO of RMBS.
The main objective of this section is to present a model for credit risk in re-
securitizations. The numerical results are for illustration only. The numerical
results from the model show that, starting from the same pool of mortgages, a
super-senior RMBS tranche rated AAA and a super-senior CDO tranche rated
AAA actually have very dierent credit risk characteristics.
2.3.2 Some Qualitative Observations
We can make several qualitative observations on the dierence between a secu-
ritization tranche and a re-securitization tranche.
The fundamental dierence lies in the fact that they have collateral support that
have very dierent characteristics. For securitization tranches, usually the collateral
consists of stand-alone bonds, loans, or in the case of RMBS, mortgages; while for
re-securitization tranches, the collateral consists of RMBS tranches or tranches of
other Asset-Backed Securities (ABS).
Mortgages and RMBS tranches have three big dierences: rst, in terms of loss-
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given-default, a mortgage rarely has a 100% loss when it defaults. Even in a hostile
environment like recently when housing prices have decreased a lot, LGD on a
mortgage is usually between 50% and 60% at worst. Other asset-backed securities
share similar collateral LGD levels as well. For example, Table 2.1 shows the
Moody's historical recovery rates on corporate bonds. Recovery rate is dened as
the complement of loss-given-default. One can see that senior secured bonds, which
have the highest priority among all corporate bonds, exhibit an average recovery
rate of above 50%. Meanwhile, the unsecured or subordinate bonds have average
recovery around 30%. However, thin RMBS tranches tend to have very high loss
levels when they default, which conceptually can be understood easily, since once
the tranche is hit, it only takes a few more defaults before it is completely gone.
It turns out that the mezzanine RMBS tranches that people use most to construct
CDO deals are usually very thin (around 1%), which leads to very high LGD's.
For the same reason above, one can also say that the loss distributions of a mort-
gage and an RMBS tranche are very dierent. The support of the loss distribution
of a mortgage rarely includes the 100% point. However, the loss distribution of an
mezzanine RMBS tranche will have point masses on the 0% point and the 100%
point, since it could incur no loss at all or it could lose every penny of its principal.
Secondly, individual mortgages have relatively low correlation between each
other, because of high idiosyncracy. The Basel II standard for correlation be-
tween mortgages is 15%. Conversely, RMBS tranches have rather high correlation
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Table 2.1: Moody's recovery rates on corporate bonds, 1982-2003.






Note. The recovery rates are expressed as a percentage of face value.
between each other, for the fact that through the securitization process, idiosyncra-
cies among dierent mortgages are largely diversied away. As Gordy's results have
shown, the risk left is mainly systematic risk. Although dierent RMBS tranches
do not necessarily share the same systematic risk, but they will tend to be much
more highly correlated.
The third point is relatively subtle. There have been quite some debates on
whether defaults and LGD's are correlated for (corporate) bonds, with the ma-
jority of people leaning toward the positive answer. Eorts have been made to
incorporate such correlations in the determination of capital, e.g., by the intro-
duction of `Downturn LGD'. Refer to, for example, Miu and Ozdemir (2006) for a
detailed discussion on Downturn LGD. This type of correlation also applies to the
case of RMBS tranches, but in a more evident way. For instance, when housing
prices decline, not only will the defaults on RMBS tranches go up, but the LGD
on RMBS tranches will also elevate, which is exactly what we have been observing
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in the current crisis.
Higher LGD and higher correlation as stated above make the loss distribution
of the collateral portfolio of an RMBS and a CDO very dierent. As a result, the
loss distribution of an RMBS tranche and a CDO tranche will be very dierent.
The proposed new model will naturally incorporate all these considerations.
On the other hand, a lot of nancial institutions and rating agencies did not
recognize the dierence between a regular bond and a securitization tranche, which
probably is one of the main reasons why their models failed in this crisis.
2.3.3 The Model
Our objective is to develop a model for credit risk in re-securitization (in par-
ticular CDO of RMBS). In doing so, we adopt a \look-through" approach which
means we start from the credit characteristics of the underlying primitive loans.
In that spirit we rst introduce the basic notations for credit risk metrics for the
portfolio of loans (in particular mortgages) and for the securitization tranches (in
particular RMBS) underneath the re-securitization in subsection 2.3.3.1, where we
make use of already existing results in the literature. Discussion of our model really
starts from section 2.3.3.2.
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2.3.3.1 Loss Distribution of RMBS Tranche - Securitization
Consider an RMBS which has underlying collateral of M homogeneous mort-
gages with the same probability of default (PD) p, expected loss-given-default
(LGD) , asset-value correlation (AVC)  and equal weights. We will focus on
homogeneous portfolios to keep equations and derivations simple. As pointed
out later, our results can be extended to non-homogeneous portfolios in a rather
straightforward way.
Following Pykhtin and Dev (2002a), we have a set of continuous random vari-
ables fVjgMj=1 that describe the nancial well being of each mortgage. These ran-
dom variables have standard normal distribution and trigger defaults whenever
Vj < V
D
j  N 1(p). N() and N 1() stand for the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) and the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard normal






where Y is the systematic risk factor and fWjg are idiosyncratic factors. All these
factors are independent of each other and have standard normal distribution. We
also assume independent (independent of Y and fWjg as well) and identically
distributed LGD's with expected value . In general, fVjg could stand for the
asset value of a rm, or the value of a bond, etc. Then the above equation describes
that a bond defaults when the rm's asset value drops under a certain threshold.
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So this is a very general model that covers other securitizations as well, such as
Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBO), Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO)
and Asset-Backed Securities (ABS).
Please note that the systematic risk factor in this thesis here and afterwards is
negatively correlated to the loss of the mortgage, as one can easily see from equation
(2.4). This is the most intuitive and widely accepted way of specifying loss and
asset value. So exactly opposite to (A-4), E[Uijx] will be nonincreasing in x for all
i instead of nondecreasing. But the quantile argument of Theorem 3 still holds,
since one just needs to change the sign of the systematic factor to apply the result.
Or instead of
q(E[LnjX]) =Mn(q(X)); (2.5)
one will have this equation:
q(E[LnjX]) =Mn(1 q(X)): (2.6)
We will make use of this slightly altered Gordy's result multiple times from now.
However, we will not mention this change of sign every time to avoid repetition.
Suppose M is large enough so that the portfolio can be considered ne-grained.
Because losses in all the mortgages are aected by a single systematic risk factor,
this ts right into the ASRF framework. Thus the loss distribution of the collateral
can be approximated by the limiting loss or expected loss given the systematic
28
factor Y :




















where LGDj is the LGD on the jth mortgage and 1fg is the indicator function.
Thus we have the qth quantile of loss approximately to be L1 (Y1 q) where Y1 q =
N 1(1  q).
We denote by G (l) the probability of loss exceeding l, and by (2.7),












for l < : (2.8)
Theorem 4 (Pykhtin & Dev, 2002b)





















where N2 (a; b; ) denotes the bivariate normal distribution valued at (a; b) with
mean 0, standard deviation 1 and correlation .
For those tranches [t1; t2] such that t1 <  < t2, equation (2.9) will still hold if









for any t  .
Since the portfolio or the tranche loss distribution can be characterized by the
single systematic factor Y , we also have the following property:
Corollary 1. The qth quantile of the tranche loss or loss at the condence level
(LCL) is 8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
L1 (Y1 q)  t1
t2   t1 if t1 < L
1 (Y1 q) < t2
0 if L1 (Y1 q) < t1
1 otherwise
:
One could use this LCL as the capital for the RMBS tranche if looking at the
tranche in a stand-alone fashion. But in reality, investors or banks usually buy this
tranche and put it into their own investment portfolio. This portfolio is usually
very big especially for big banks, and we will refer to this portfolio as the `super-
portfolio' in the future to dierentiate it from the collateral portfolio. This concept
originates from Pykhtin and Dev (2002b) and is exactly the concept of marginal
VaR in the value-at-risk framework (see, for example, Jorion, 2006). So the real
question of interest is how much capital the bank should allocate when it adds
this RMBS tranche to its super-portfolio. This kind of capital in the context of a
super-portfolio will be our focus here and afterwards.
The concept of capital in the context of a super-portfolio not only is more realis-
tic, but also has the advantage of being more smooth than the `stand-alone' capital
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(see Pykhtin & Dev, 2002b). As we will see later in the numerical examples, the
stand-alone capital tends to be 100% for junior tranches and 0% for senior tranches.
This phenomenon makes the stand-alone capital very unsatisfactory particularly for
regulatory purpose. (For example, this would mean that literally all `AAA'-rated
tranches will be allowed `zero' capital.)
We would like to apply Gordy's results in the next step. In order to do that,
we need to make some assumptions on the super-porfolio, namely (A-1) (A-4). In
more practical terms, we have assumed that
i. the super-portfolio where the tranche is held is asymptotically ne-grained;
ii. the super-portfolio is driven by another single systematic risk factor Z; and
iii. investors exposure to the tranche is small compared to total exposure in the
super-portfolio.
These are weak enough conditions that most portfolios of big institutions will sat-
isfy. Refer to Pykhtin and Dev (2002b) for details.
Suppose that we place the RMBS tranche into a super-portfolio of which the






where the correlation is denoted by  and  represents a standard normal random
variable independent of Z. Additionally, if we assume the super-portfolio satises
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all the requirements of the ASRF model, then in order to calculate the capital for
the RMBS tranche in the context of the super-portfolio, we only need to apply
Theorem 3 and compute E

LRMBSjZ.
First we could compute the probability of loss exceeding level l given the super-
portfolio systematic factor Z:
















for l < :
(2.11)



























For those tranches [t1; t2] such that t1 <  < t2, we could replace the term N
 1 (t=)















Theorem 5 (Pykhtin & Dev, 2002b)





as dened in (2.12).
From the above expressions of EL and LCL of an RMBS tranche given in (2.9)
and (2.12), respectively, some properties of the two can be seen:
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First, for the loss of a whole portfolio, we know that the expected loss does not
depend on anything but PD and LGD. But for the loss of an RMBS tranche, not
only does it depend on these two parameters, it also depends on the asset value
correlation as well. In general, equity tranches' EL decreases when AVC increases,
while senior tranches's EL increases when AVC increases. In other words, higher
correlation favors equity tranches, but disfavors senior tranches. There is a grey
area of mezzanine tranches in the middle, whose direction of movement will depend
on their position and other deal specics.
Second, for LCL or capital in the context of a super-portfolio, correlation to the
super-portfolio plays an important role. It is not very straightforward though to
see how it impacts the capital. Let's consider extreme situations rst:
If  = 0, it means that the loss of this tranche is independent of the total





















So in this case, LCL will be equal to EL for all tranches, meaning that no matter how
the super-portfolio performs, the conditional expected loss of the RMBS tranche
will always be equal to the unconditional EL.
If  = 1, it means that the loss of this tranche is perfectly correlated with the





















t2   t1 if t1 < L
1 (Y1 q) < t2
0 if L1 (Y1 q) < t1
1 otherwise
;
which means that LCL in the context of the super-portfolio will be equal to the
stand-alone capital.
In practice, because of its interpretation as the correlation between two sys-
tematic factors,  is usually set between 0.5 and 1. In this case, compared to the
stand-alone capital,  has the eect of transferring capital from junior tranches to
senior tranches. Refer to Pykhtin and Dev (2002b) for more details.
2.3.3.2 Loss Distribution of CDO Tranche - Re-securitization
Now we consider a CDO comprised ofK homogeneous RMBS mezzanine tranches
[t1; t2] taken from dierent mortgage pools. Suppose the loss of the collateral (i.e.,
the underlying RMBS mezzanine tranches) is driven by a single common factor X,








and i for i = 1 to K represents the idiosyncratic term which follows a standard
normal distribution and is independent of X.
Here we will assume additionally that   t2, which means the detachment point
of the RMBS tranche is below the expected LGD of mortgages. This is nearly a
trivial assumption since it is almost universally true for all mezzanine tranches.
The expressions below will not be as simple if they are to be applied to senior
tranches where the assumption above does not hold, but the derivation will remain
the same.
The CDO portfolio that the RMBS tranche is put into can be regarded as a
\super-portfolio" as we dened previously. If we look at the default probability and
expected LGD of each RMBS within the super-portfolio, we can use the previous
results of equations (2.11) and (2.12):







































Now we can see that the default probability and expected LGD of the RMBS
tranches are correlated through the common systematic factor X, although not in
a simplistic way. For example, the two are not necessarily monotonic with respect
to each other. The relationship will depend on the shape of the loss distribution of
35
underlying mortgages.
Heuristically, one can easily argue that when the thickness of a tranche ap-
proaches zero, the LGD of that tranche will approach 100%. This is stated in the
following proposition which applies to the unconditional case as well.




Let F (s)  E LRMBSjZ = s; = 1 as dened in equation (2.12). If K is
large enough, due to diversication, the qth quantile of the limiting loss can be
approximated by F (X1 q) as indicated by Theorem 3. Similar to the case for
RMBS tranches in Corollary 1, we can have the following
Proposition 1 (Stand-alone Capital of a CDO tranche)
The qth quantile of tranche loss or loss at the condence level (LCL) is8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
F (X1 q)  T1
T2   T1 if T1 < F (X1 q) < T2
0 if F (X1 q) < T1
1 otherwise
:
Because we assumed   t2, the probability of loss exceeding l can be written
as: G (l) = N (F 1 (l)). Following this technique, we can derive also the EL of the
CDO tranche.
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Proposition 2 (Expected Loss of a CDO tranche)



























i = 1; 2




























and N3 (a; b; c; ) denotes the trivariate normal distribution valued at (a; b; c) with
mean zero and covariance matrix .
If a bank places the CDO tranche into their investment portfolio, which can be







in which the correlation is denoted by 1 and  represents a standard normal random
variable independent of Z. Together with (2.10) and (2.13), it implies  = 11.
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Under this model assumption, the conditional probability of loss exceeding l
given the systematic factor can be written as:
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h










































Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Capital of a CDO tranche in the context of a super-portfolio)




  E LCDO as dened in (2.14) and (2.15).
We can see that in the re-securitization model, as we intended, LGDs of RMBS
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tranches are now derived from their underlying collateral characteristics rather than
directly specied as in LGDs of mortgages in the securitization model. Correlation
between the RMBS tranches 1 is also an additional parameter that we can set to
be much higher than AVC between mortgages.
What is still similar to the securitization model is that 1 now has the same eect
that  had before. Higher correlation between RMBS tranches will favor low CDO
tranches and disfavor high CDO tranches. The correlation to the super-portfolio
still plays a similar role as in the securitization model. We will see more concrete
examples in the numerical section and get a better view of the parameters.
Note that our results above can be easily extended to the non-homogeneous
case. If we assume that the ith RMBS tranche's PD, LGD, tranche limits and
weights in the CDO portfolio are pi, i, ti1, ti2 and wi, respectively. We have the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Loss distribution of a non-homogeneous CDO)
If Gordy's conditions (A-1) to (A-4) are satised, we have the same expected

































While the number M of underlying mortgages in a RMBS is very large, the
number of underlying RMBS tranchesK in a CDO of RMBS may not be. Therefore,
a granularity adjustment becomes necessary. The loss of a coarse-grained CDO with
K RMBS tranches can be written as:
LCDOK = E

LCDOjX+R (X) +O  K 2
in which R (X) stands for the rst order adjustment. If we neglect terms of higher
orders than K 1 and let F (X) = E

LCDOjX + R (X), the qth quantile of the
CDO portfolio loss can still be approximated by F (X1 q), and the probability of
loss exceeding l can still be written as G (l) = N (F 1 (l)). As a result, the stand-
alone capital of a coarse-grained CDO tranche will have a similar expression as in
Proposition 1 with the newly dened F (X).
Accordingly, to derive the expected loss of a coarse-grained CDO tranche, one















The computation will have to be carried out by numerical integration in this case.
One important thing to note here is that the above granularity adjustment for EL
may not work for equity tranches or some `junior' mezzanine tranches that are just
above the equity tranche in the capital structure. Because when losses are small,
or X is not in its left tail, the granularity adjustment term is not valid.
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Now the only task left is for us to derive the expression of the granularity adjust-
ment term R(x). Let  (x)  E LRMBSjX = x and  (x)  V ar LRMBSjX = x.
Following Gordy (2003) and Wilde (2001),
R (x) =   1
2K0 (x)












and ~  1  
1  1
:
Equation (2.12) leads to
 (x) =




















































































































0 (x)  2 (x) 0 (x) :
(2.21)
Plugging equations (2.17) - (2.21) into (2.16), we can obtain the granularity adjust-
ment term R(x).
Corollary 2 (Granularity Adjustment term for a coarse-grained CDO)
Using the above notations, the granularity adjustment term for a coarse-grained
CDO can be calculated as
R (x) =   1
2K0 (x)








where 0(x), 00(x), v(x) and v0(x) are as dened in equations (2.17) - (2.21).
2.3.3.4 Numerical Results
The CDO we consider here in this section has ve dierent tranches and is made
up of K = 30 RMBS mezzanine tranches. The RMBS tranches are homogeneous
with tranche limits equal to (3%, 5%), PD = 3%; LGD = 20% and AVC = 0:15.
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Condence level q = 99.9% is used, and the correlation between the CDO and the
super-portfolio is assumed to be 0.9. Results are also shown with a range of possible
correlation between RMBS tranches, from 0.5 to 0.8.
For comparison to our theoretical results, we also performed a `look-through'
simulation on the CDO, where loss distributions of RMBS tranches are generated
according to equation (2.7) and then aggregated for computation of EL and loss
quantile or loss at the condence level (LCL) of the CDO. All simulation results
are based on 1,000,000 Monte Carlo samples.
The following columns are displayed in Table 2.2: LCL(sim) or LCL from simu-
lation, LCL(sa) or standalone LCL, LCL(adj) or LCL with granularity adjustment,
LCL(sp) or LCL in the context of a super-portfolio, EL(sim) or EL from simula-
tion, EL(grn) or EL from analytical solution assuming granular CDO portfolio, and
EL(adj) or EL with granularity adjustment.
It can be seen from the tables that across dierent RMBS tranche correlations,
the theoretical LCL values are fairly close to their simulation-based counterparts
for most of the tranches. After granularity adjustment, the two values agree even
more. The same can be said for expected loss except for the equity tranche, where
adjusted EL does not work as noted before.
As in the case of securitizations, the LCL values in the context of a super-
portfolio exhibit the phenomenon of transferring capital from junior tranches to
senior tranches. And the super-senior tranche of the CDO is not allocated zero
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Table 2.2: EL and LCL with K = 30
Tranche
Limits(%) LCL(sim) LCL(sa) LCL(adj) LCL(sp) EL(sim) EL(grn) EL(adj)
RMBS Tranche Correlation = 0.5
0.0 - 6.0 100 100 100 99.2367 3.7666 3.9826 4.8402
6.0 - 7.0 100 100 100 94.9089 1.0023 0.7931 0.9916
7.0 - 15.0 100 100 100 74.2016 0.4605 0.3639 0.4551
15.0 - 50.0 17.0357 11.6144 16.8975 9.8743 0.0504 0.0387 0.0494
50.0 - 100.0 0 0 0 0.0017 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007
RMBS Tranche Correlation = 0.6
0.0 - 6.0 100 100 100 99.4750 3.2761 3.4898 3.9971
6.0 - 7.0 100 100 100 96.9279 1.1016 0.9679 1.1002
7.0 - 15.0 100 100 100 85.0848 0.5826 0.5123 0.5817
15.0 - 50.0 35.3093 30.0065 34.4230 21.9768 0.0944 0.0814 0.0935
50.0 - 100.0 0 0 0 0.0940 0.0036 0.0025 0.0031
RMBS Tranche Correlation = 0.7
0.0 - 6.0 100 100 100 99.5047 2.7826 2.9278 3.1624
6.0 - 7.0 100 100 100 97.5858 1.1390 1.0555 1.1313
7.0 - 15.0 100 100 100 90.2197 0.6766 0.6282 0.6729
15.0 - 50.0 58.8438 52.9004 56.4758 37.2015 0.1545 0.1397 0.1509
50.0 - 100.0 0 0 0 1.0598 0.0102 0.0088 0.0100
RMBS Tranche Correlation = 0.8
0.0 - 6.0 100 100 100 99.3644 2.2087 2.3116 2.3580
6.0 - 7.0 100 100 100 97.5508 1.0768 1.0489 1.0825
7.0 - 15.0 100 100 100 92.4092 0.7079 0.6933 0.7157
15.0 - 50.0 87.2661 82.5996 85.2957 52.7641 0.2154 0.2088 0.2168
50.0 - 100.0 0 0 0 5.1389 0.0269 0.0241 0.0258
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Table 2.3: CDO Tranche 15% - 50%
RMBS
Correlation 30 50 100 200 500 1
Loss at the 99.9% Condence Level
0.5 16.8975 14.7842 13.1993 12.4069 11.9314 11.6144
0.6 34.4230 32.6564 31.3315 30.6690 30.2715 30.0065
0.7 56.4758 55.0456 53.9730 53.4367 53.1149 52.9004
0.8 85.2957 84.2172 83.4084 83.0040 82.7613 82.5996
Expected Loss
0.5 0.0494 0.0449 0.0417 0.0402 0.0393 0.0387
0.6 0.0935 0.0885 0.0849 0.0831 0.0821 0.0814
0.7 0.1509 0.1463 0.1430 0.1413 0.1403 0.1397
0.8 0.2168 0.2136 0.2112 0.2100 0.2093 0.2088
capital any more as in other standalone cases.
In Table 2.3, we focus on LCL and EL values for the (15%, 50%) CDO tranche
in the previous example with dierent level of granularity (K). It is straightforward
to observe that the granularity adjustment shrinks as K increases and idiosyncratic
risks are diversied away. Also noticeable is that the granularity adjustment in-
creases as RMBS tranche correlation decreases, which is also understandable given
the fact that lower correlation increases the idiosyncratic risk of a non-granular
portfolio. In the extreme case, when RMBS tranche correlation is close to 1, gran-
ularity adjustment would not be necessary.
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2.3.3.5 Conclusion
In securitization, the underlying collateral consists of loans and bonds while in
re-securitization the underlying collateral consists of tranches of securitization. In
terms of loss given default or equivalently extent of penetration into a tranche and
in terms of tail of loss distribution, tranches are nothing like bonds. Hence our
premise is that the credit risk in re-securitization is very dierent from the credit
risk in securitization.
In this part we have developed a full-edged model for credit risk in resecuritiza-
tion using established principles of portfolio credit risk methodologies. The model
is analytically tractable and can, therefore, be quickly implemented. The numerical
results illustrate that after applying granularity adjustments, we get essentially the
same results as a Monte Carlo simulation.
2.3.4 Application: Are the AAA Ratings Justied?
The term CDO has earned a rather poor reputation in recent memory. In the
nancial turmoil that started in the latter half of 2007, clearly a disproportionate
role has been played by the billions of dollars of marked-to-market losses suered
by nancial institutions on CDOs created out of tranches of Residential Mortgage-
backed Securities (RMBS), which in turn were created from subprime mortgages.
Such CDOs may be cash CDOs or synthetic CDOs (Credit Default Swaps written
with a super-senior tranche of a CDO of RMBS as reference entity).
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Some writers in the popular press have recently expressed their shock that low
quality subprime mortgages could be packaged into securities in eect as creditwor-
thy as U.S. Treasury bonds. Last year, U.S. Congressional testimony of the heads
of major U.S. rating agencies indicated that staers and Congressmen were also
appalled at how the rating agencies could have given such pristine ratings to bonds
structured out of low quality subprime mortgages. As has been noted: \High rat-
ings given to low-quality assets, particularly those based on risky mortgages, have
been criticized by authorities round the world for contributing to the credit mar-
ket bubbles that have collapsed in the crisis" (Financial Times, October 23, 2008).
More recently, the European Commission has come out strongly against the rat-
ing agencies as reected in the following viewpoint: \Agencies gave top ratings to
subprime-related structured nance products adding to the crisis of summer 2007.
They also later failed to reect in their ratings the market's worsening conditions"
(Ignites Europe, November 13, 2008). In what follows, we show that the sentiments
expressed are not quite logical.
The average investor is typically a `AAA' investor. Most investors and pension
funds treat AAA-rated investments in the same category (of safety) as Treasury
instruments. The average investor has always been cognizant of the fact that a
re-securitization like a CDO of RMBS is more complex and less transparent than a
securitization like RMBS. But the fact that both are AAA-rated seems to indicate,
at rst glance, that the credit risk in the two types of securities must be quite
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similar, especially if the structures (securitization and re-securitization) are created
out of the same pool of underlying subprime mortgages. In what follows, we show
that this is far from the case.
We extended the applications of the asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model,
introduced by Gordy (2003) for credit risk in subprime portfolios, and of the se-
curitization credit risk model introduced in Pykhtin and Dev (2002b). What we
will apply are mainly results of this chapter on typical mortgage securitizations and
re-securitizations.
A subprime mortgage, by denition, is a loan to a household with poor credit
history as reected in the credit score and consequently the probability of default
(PD). In recent years, the steep decline in home prices and the prevalence of poor
underwriting documentation on appraisals as well as income have increased the
loss given default (LGD) on defaulted subprime mortgages. Prime mortgages, in
contrast, are characterized by much lower PD and somewhat lower LGD. The two
risk measures we will focus on both for the underlying pool of mortgages and for
the tranches of RMBS and the tranches of CDO of RMBS are: Expected Loss (EL)
and Unexpected Loss (UL). The former is nothing more than the product of PD
and LGD. The latter also gives us an idea of the equity capital that is put at risk
to support an investment in the applicable tranche. Mathematically, UL is nothing
more than the dierence between LCL and EL.
We consider here as a numerical example of CDO senior tranches (with 20%
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or 50% credit enhancement underneath) that have RMBS mezzanine and senior
tranches as their underlying collateral. Each of the RMBS, in turn, has underlying
collateral of thousands of mortgages with homogeneous PD, LGD and asset value
correlation (AVC). One low PD (1%) and one high PD (5%) scenarios are studied.
UL here is based on the 99.9% condence level. In order to model re-securitizations,
we need one more input variable which is the correlation between dierent RMBS
tranches. Although the range of probable values of this correlation is not clear so far,
it has to be signicantly greater than AVC between individual mortgages because
in an ASRF framework, idiosyncratic risks are diversied away from an RMBS
portfolio, leaving the correlation between RMBS tranches to be the correlation
between systematic risk factors.
In each sub-table of Table 2.4 and Table 2.5, we show sequentially the EL and
UL of the RMBS tranche and the EL and UL of the CDO tranches made out of
the corresponding RMBS tranches. The following observations can be made after
an examination of the results:
 As pointed out in Pykhtin and Dev (2002b) and acknowledged by most practi-
tioners, thin securitization tranches are generally riskier than thick tranches,
mainly because of higher LGDs. As a result, re-securitizations with thin
securitization tranches underneath are riskier.
 When PD is relatively low, or for `near-prime' mortgages, it is possible to
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Table 2.4: EL and UL of RMBS and CDO tranches
Low PD (1%) High PD (5%)
Thick Securitization Tranches Thick Securitization Tranches
Securitization Securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
3 8 0.0226 3.3129 3 8 3.0210 63.0955
Re-securitization Re-securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
20 100 0.0017 0.3022 20 100 1.0868 42.1947
50 100 0.0002 0.0258 50 100 0.3348 26.0281
Securitization Securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
5 10 0.0017 0.3002 5 10 0.6871 37.0500
Re-securitization Re-securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
20 100 0.0001 0.0110 20 100 0.1882 16.8579
50 100 0.0000 0.0006 50 100 0.0509 7.1212
Securitization Securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
10 15 0.0000 0.0003 10 15 0.0160 2.6377
Re-securitization Re-securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
20 100 0.0000 0.0000 20 100 0.0020 0.3494
50 100 0.0000 0.0000 50 100 0.0004 0.0526
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Table 2.5: EL and UL of RMBS and CDO tranches (continued)
Low PD (1%) High PD (5%)
Thin Securitization Tranches Thin Securitization Tranches
Securitization Securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
3 4 0.0832 11.4104 3 4 8.1225 85.6365
Re-securitization Re-securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
20 100 0.0217 3.4189 20 100 5.0456 75.5386
50 100 0.0066 1.1695 50 100 2.8298 69.4426
Securitization Securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
5 6 0.0061 1.0913 5 6 1.8361 66.0785
Re-securitization Re-securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
20 100 0.0010 0.1633 20 100 0.8777 42.8805
50 100 0.0002 0.0307 50 100 0.4000 30.5012
Securitization Securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
10 11 0.0000 0.0011 10 11 0.0445 6.9995
Re-securitization Re-securitization
Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%) Attach(%) Detach(%) EL(%) UL(%)
20 100 0.0000 0.0000 20 100 0.0108 1.8385
50 100 0.0000 0.0000 50 100 0.0032 0.5647
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make high-quality (AAA-rated) CDO tranches with close-to-zero EL out of
RMBS mezzanine tranches, although the CDO tranches often have UL that
cannot be ignored. On the other hand, for subprime mortgages or in situations
where PD rises to 5%, even credit enhancement of 50% is not enough to make
the CDO senior tranche safe in terms of EL. Moreover, the corresponding UL
is substantial.
 If we compare the senior tranche of a securitization to that of a re-securitization,
an RMBS senior tranche with 20% of support has close-to-zero EL and UL,
and these two metrics do not suer big increases when PD elevates to 5%.
Conversely, when mortgage quality deteriorates, those seemingly `safe' CDO
senior tranches made out of mezzanine RMBS tranches exhibit huge increases
in both EL and UL, and are obviously not `safe' any more.
The above points could be further explained by Figure 2.3 which shows the
amount of support needed to make the top tranche `AAA' for RMBS and reects
two kinds of CDO. It can be seen that a CDO made out of thin RMBS tranches
requires more support than one made out of thick tranches; an RMBS generally
requires less support than a CDO constructed from mezzanine RMBS tranches; and
the support such a CDO needs to make its most senior tranche `AAA' increases
dramatically as PD increases, to such an extent that when PD is 5%, a AAA rating
is virtually impossible to achieve.
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PD = 1% PD = 2% PD = 5%





CDO1 stands for a CDO made out of thick mezzanine RMBS tranches (6% - 11%)
CDO2 stands for a CDO made out of thin mezzanine RMBS tranches (6% - 7%)
In conclusion, it is not irrational to be shocked at how rating agencies could
have given such high ratings (AAA) to structures made out of very low credit
quality subprime mortgages. A AAA-bond can be created out of a portfolio of
subprime mortgages and there is nothing surprising about it. However, whether
it is appropriate to do so depends on the securitization structure in question. In
this section we show that in a RMBS (securitization) structure, whether made out
of a pool of prime or subprime mortgages a AAA tranche can easily be created.
Similarly, in a CDO (re-securitization) structure made out of senior RMBS tranches,
it is not dicult to create a AAA tranche, with enough credit enhancement; and
this can be made out of a pool of prime mortgages or a pool of subprime mortgages.
However, in a CDO (re-securitization) structure made out of mezzanine or junior
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RMBS tranches with subprime mortgages as underlying collateral, it is almost
impossible to create a AAA tranche.
Coincidentally, Hull and White (2010) studied essentially the same problem us-
ing Copula and simulation techniques. Although their applied a dierent method-
ology, they arrived at essentially the same conclusion as ours:
\Contrary to many of the opinions that have been expressed, the AAA ratings
for the senior tranches of ABSs were not unreasonable. The weighted average life of
mortgages is about ve years. The probability of loss and expected loss of the AAA-
rated tranches that were created were similar to or better than those of AAA-rated
ve-year bonds.
\The AAA ratings for Mezz ABS CDOs are much less defensible. Scenarios
where all the underlying BBB tranches lose virtually all their principal are su-
ciently probable that it is not reasonable to assign a AAA rating to even a quite
thin senior tranche."
2.3.5 Derivation of Results
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C. Derivation of granularity adjustment results in section 2.3.3.3
v (x) = E
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2.4 Modeling Credit Risk in Securitizations Us-
ing Student's t Copula
2.4.1 A Review of Copula Functions
In statistics, a copula is used as a general way of formulating a multivariate
distribution in such a way that various general types of dependence can be rep-
resented. In nance, copula has been widely used in recent year because of the
need to model all kinds of dependency between dierent obligors, bonds or other
nancial instruments. See for example Li (2000).
Denition 1. An n-dimensional colupa is a function C : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] which has
the following properties:
1. C(u) is increasing in each component uk with k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng.
2. For every vector u 2 [0; 1]n; C(u) = 0 if at least one coordinate of the vector
u is 0 and C(u) = uk if all the coordinate of u are equal to 1 except the k-th
one.
3. For every a, b 2 [0; 1]n with a  b, given a hypercube B = [a;b] = [a1; b1] 
[a2; b2]    [an; bn] whose vertices lie in the domain of C, its volume VC(B) 
0.
Sklar's Theorem. Let G be an n-dimensional distribution function with margins
F1; F2; : : : ; Fn. Then there exist an n-dimensional copula C such that, for x 2 Rn
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we have
G(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) = C(F1(x1); F2(x2); : : : ; Fn(xn)): (2.22)
Moreover, if F1; F2; : : : ; Fn are continuous, then C is unique.
Denition 2. Let (X1; X2) be a bivariate vector of continuous random variables
with marginal distribution functions F1 and F2. The coecients of upper U and
lower L tail dependence, provided that the limit U 2 [0; 1] (in case of upper tail
dependence) and L 2 [0; 1] (in case of lower tail dependence) exist, are respectively
given by the following expressions:
U = lim
u%1




P[X2  F 12 (u)jX1  F 11 (u)]: (2.24)
For a more detailed review of copula functions, refer to, e.g., Galiani (2003).
2.4.2 Connection of ASRF to Gaussian Copula
We rst need to recognize that the single risk factor model in Pykhtin and
Dev (2002a, 2002b) is in essence a Multivariate Gaussian Copula model. We can
re-formulate the problem as follows in typical copula form:
~T = (T1; T2;    ; Tn) are default times of the portfolio of n bonds, which follow
some joint distribution and each dimension has the same type of marginal distri-
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bution F (exponential, Weibull, etc.). For each bond, if Ti < 1 year then default
happens. P (Ti < 1) = pi and LGD is  .
To characterize the correlation structure between the default times ~T , we can
use the Gaussian Copula
C(u1; u2; : : : ; un;R) = R
 
 1(u1); 1(u2); : : : ; 1(un)

(2.25)
where R = (rij)nn is the covariance matrix here with rij = 1 and rii =  for
i 6= j, R is the standardized multivariate normal distribution function with co-
variance matrix R, and  1(u) denotes the inverse of standard normal cumulative
distribution function.
It is obvious to see that the model above is equivalent to the ASRF model in
equation (2.4). If we apply Sklar's theorem, then we get the joint default times
with Gaussian Copula. Because our primary interest is in defaults and losses, not
exact timing of default, so we do not need to recover default times from the copula
here.
For the purpose of calculating capital required for an RMBS tranche in the
context of a super-portfolio, we also need to take into account the systematic factor






we get corr(Xi; Z) =
p
. Thus, we can expand the previous Gaussian Copula to
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the following:
C(u1; u2; : : : ; un; ~R) =  ~R
 







1CCA ; RT12 = R21 = p;    ;pn1 :
Then according to Gordy's (2003) theorems, capital for the RMBS tranche in a






2.4.3 Motivation for Using an Alternative Copula
A very important property that dierentiates dierent types of Copulas is the
lower tail dependence as dened in equation (2.24). It can be shown that Gaussian
Copulas have asymptotically zero tail dependence (see e.g. Galiani, 2003). Many
researchers and practitioners have recognized this as a major drawback of Gaussian
Copula, mainly from the perspective of valuing a structured product. For example,
Malevergne and Sornette (2003) pointed out that \the Gaussian Copula hypothe-
sis can be rejected for the dependence between pairs of commodities according to
market data. Even in cases where the Gaussian Copula hypothesis is not rejected
for most of the currencies and the stocks, a non-Gaussian copula, such as the Stu-
dent's t Copula, cannot be rejected if it has suciently many `degrees of freedom'.
Then, depending on the correlation coecient, the Student's t Copula can predict a
63
non-negligible tail dependence which is completely missed by the Gaussian Copula
assumption."
In statistical sense, valuation is focused on the center or mean of the price
distribution, while capital (or VaR, more generally) which we are trying to model
here is the tail metric of the loss distribution. This fact implies that Gaussian
Copula may not be the most desirable when modeling the tail of a loss distribution.
We would want to try other Copulas which have higher tail dependence. In banking,
capital usually represents the amount of reserve that is necessary to keep a bank
from insolvency in extreme conditions. In this sense, using an alternative Copula
is at least an approach to be cautious or conservative.
Moreover, for a `senior' or `super-senior' tranche of a securitization, the degree
of tail dependence will aect not only its tail loss, but also its mean or average
loss. This is because of the fact that those senior tranches usually enjoy high credit
support, so it is the very tail of the portfolio loss distribution that potentially could
hit them. Stronger tail dependence among collateral pieces results in `fatter' tail of
the portfolio loss distribution, thus potentially making the senior tranches hit more
often and more severely.
2.4.4 The Student's t Copula
In the following sections, we will use the Multivariate Student's t Copula in
the place of Gaussian Copula and manifest the eect of dierent Copulas and tail
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dependence.
The Student's t Copula is dened as follows:









where R is still the covariance matrix, TR; is the standardized multivariate Stu-
dent's t distribution with covariance matrix R and  degree of freedom. t 1 (u)
denotes the inverse of Student's t cumulative distribution function.
There are three main reasons for choosing Student's t Copula for our purpose:
rst, the tail dependence of t Copula is not zero even if correlation is low or equal
to zero. In fact, in the bivariate case we have
U = 2  2t+1
 
p





where r is the correlation coecient. As the degree of freedom increases, tail depen-
dency decreases. lim
!1
U = 0 as Student's t Copula tends to the Gaussian Copula.
Secondly, despite the dierence in tails, t Copula or multivariate t distribution is
closely related to the multivariate normal distribution, which leads to some de-
sirable properties such as the conditional distributions as we will see later. Last
but not least, compared to other copulas with non-trivial tail dependence, such as
Archimidean Copulas, the multivariate t distribution underlying the t Copula is
much easier to simulate.
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2.4.5 Multivariate t Distribution
According to Kotz and Nadarajah (2004), a p-dimensional random vector X =
(X1; : : : ; Xp)
T is said to have the standardized p-variate t distribution with degrees












Next, we will cite properties of marginal and conditional distributions of a mul-
tivariate t distribution from Kotz and Nadarajah (2004).
Let X possess the p-variate t distribution with degrees of freedom  and covari-










where X1 is p1  1 and R11 is p1  p1.
ThenX1 will have the p1-variate t distribution with degrees of freedom  and co-
variance matrix R11. Symmetrically, X2 will have the (p p1)-variate t distribution
with degrees of freedom  and covariance matrix R22.
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Furthermore, the conditional pdf of X2 given X1 is given by










[1 + (1=)xTR 111 x](+p)=2
:
(2.29)
Equation (2.29) can be rewritten as
f(x2jx1) =  (( + p)=2)























x21 = x2  R21R 111 x1
and
R221 = R22  R21R 111 R12:





















are independent, that Y1 has the p1-variate t distribution with degrees of freedom
 and covariance matrix R11, and that Y2 has the (p   p1)-variate t distribution
with degrees of freedom  + p1 and covariance matrix R221=diag(R221).
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Therefore, although the conditional distribution of X2 given X1 may not be
straightforward. Equation (2.31) can be used to generate the conditional distribu-
tion via a linear transformation of a Student's t random variable.
2.4.6 Securitization Model with Student's t Copula
Now we will use the Student's t Copula described in the previous sections to
model the credit risk in securitizations in the place of the original Gaussian Copula.
Model setup remains the same as in Section (2.4.2), except we will replace
Gaussian copula as in Equation (2.26) with the t Copula:













1CCA ; RT12 = R21 = p;    ;pn1 :
Note: the same covariance matrix is used as in Gaussian Copula because of the fact
that from a calibration point of view, the same Kendall's  rank correlation will
imply the same covariance matrix for Gaussian and t Copulas (refer to e.g. Fang
& Fang, 2002).
The last dimension of the t Copula corresponds to the systematic risk factor of
the super-portfolio. Due to the fact that the marginal distribution of a multivariate
t distribution is still t distribution, this systematic factor Z will be a univariate t
random variable.
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Because of the change of correlation structure, we do not have a closed-form
solution for loss of the portfolio or the expected loss of a tranche E(LRMBS) in this
case. However, it is still straightforward to simulate the defaults using Student's t
Copula and use the setup in Section (2.4.2) to achieve default probability pi, thus
estimate the expected loss of each tranche.
When we consider the super-portfolio, we still have a single systematic risk
factor. It is relatively simple to verify that the t distributed risk factor Z satises
(A-3) and (A-4) in Gordy (2003) because E[UijZ] is nondecreasing in Z for all i or







to estimate the tranche loss at the (q  100)% condence level.
Hence, we now need to focus on the portfolio and tranche loss distribution given
systematic risk factor Z. As pointed out in Section (2.4.5), we can utilize equation
















whereT has the n-variate t distribution with degrees of freedom +1 and covariance
matrix R221=diag(R221).
On the other hand, thanks to equation (2.33), we have transformed the estima-
tion of LCL which is tail metric to conditional expected loss. As in most Monte
69
Table 2.6: Student's t Copula with dierent degrees of freedom
Expected Loss
Attach Detach 1 100 20 10
0 3 28.7542 28.2826 27.2098 25.7022
3 6 1.1641 1.4304 2.4173 3.4178
6 10 0.0595 0.0894 0.2874 0.6085
10 100 0.0001 0.0002 0.0010 0.0040
Loss at the 99.9% Condence Level
Attach Detach 1 100 20 10
0 3 96.2201 96.8266 98.9601 99.8179
3 6 51.2746 57.3931 77.6260 91.8338
6 10 8.1151 11.8287 29.7266 54.4169
10 100 0.0132 0.0296 0.1921 0.6928
Carlo simulations, it is much easier to get a stable mean estimate than a tail esti-
mate.
Now we have a complete Monte Carlo strategy to simulate the EL and LCL of
a securitization tranche.
2.4.7 Numerical Results
We present here a simplied deal with 4 tranches: 0-3%, 3-6%, 6-10% and 10-
100%. Expected loss and loss at the 99.9% condence level are exhibited under four
dierent Student's t Copula models: Student's t with innite degrees of freedom,
which degenerates to the Gaussian Copula, then degree of freedom at 100, 20 and
10, respectively.
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It could be observed from the results in Table 2.6 that both the EL and LCL
of all the tranches increase as the degree of freedom of the Student's t Copula
decreases, which comes from the fact that tail dependence of Student's t Copula
increases as degree of freedom decreases.
It can also be concluded that the senior tranches of the structure are aected
more than junior tranches by the tail dependence. For the equity and mezza-
nine tranches, since the EL and LCL were already substantial even under Gaus-
sian assumptions, the switch to Student's t Copula only increase the losses by, in
some cases, just several percentage points. On the contrary, those senior tranches
that have ignorable EL and LCL numbers under Gaussian Copula have sometimes
startling escalations when calculated under Student's t Copula. For example, if
we compare the Student's t case with 10 degrees of freedom to the Gaussian case,
the super-senior tranche's (10-100%) EL hikes up about 40 times, while the LCL
heightens to more than 50 times. These phenomena can also be seen from Figure
2.4.
We can appreciate the big dierence that the degree of freedom makes through
the Moody's ratings implied by the tranche EL's as well. The supporting senior
tranche here (6-10%) has implied ratings under the four models Baa1, Baa1, Baa3
and Ba1, respectively. The super-senior tranche has Aaa, Aaa, Aa2 and A1 as its







3.1.1 Survival Analysis and Survival Data
Survival analysis is a branch of statistics that involves the modelling of time to
event data; in this context, death or failure is considered an \event" in the survival
analysis literature. Survival analysis attempts to answer questions such as: what is
the fraction of a population which will survive past a certain time? Of those that
survive, at what rate will they die or fail? Can multiple causes of death or failure
be taken into account? How do particular circumstances or characteristics increase
or decrease the odds of survival?
The primary objective of survival analysis is usually the \survival function" that
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is conventionally denoted by `S'. The survival function is dened as
S(t) = Pr(T > t)
where t denotes xed time, T is a random variable denoting the time of event,
and \Pr" stands for probability. That is, the survival function is the probability
that the time of death is later than some specied time. The survival function is
also called the `survivor function' or `survivorship function' in problems of biological
survival.
The survival function must be non-increasing: S(u)  S(t) if u  t. This
property follows directly from F (t) = 1  S(t) being the integral of a non-negative
function, as will be seen below. This reects the notion that survival at a later
age is only possible if surviving all younger ages. Given this property, the lifetime
distribution function and event density, which will be dened below as F and f ,
are well-dened.
Related quantities are dened in terms of the survival function. The \lifetime
distribution function", conventionally denoted by F , is dened as the complement
of the survival function,
F (t) = Pr(T  t) = 1  S(t); (3.1)
and the derivative of F (i.e., the density function of the lifetime distribution) is
conventionally denoted by f ,





f is sometimes called the \event density"; it is the rate of death or failure events
per unit time. Conversely, the survival function is often also dened in terms of the
distribution and density functions
S(t) = Pr(T > t) =
Z 1
t
f(u) du = 1  F (t): (3.3)
The hazard function, conventionally denoted by (t), is dened as the event
rate at time t conditional on survival until time t or later,






The hazard function is often the focus of modeling in survival analysis. The
hazard function must be non-negative, (t)  0, and its integral over [0;1) must
be innite, but is not otherwise constrained; the hazard function may be increasing
or decreasing, nonmonotonic, or discontinuous.
The hazard function can alternatively be represented in terms of the \cumulative
hazard function", conventionally denoted by (t):















which is the \accumulation" of the hazard over time.
Censoring is a form of missing data problem which is common in survival anal-
ysis. Ideally, both the birth and death dates of a subject are known, in which case
the lifetime is known. If it is known only that the date of death is after some
date, this is called right censoring. Right censoring will occur for those subjects
whose birth date is known but who are still alive when they are lost to follow-up
or when the study ends. A lot of the methodologies in survival analysis deals with
the problem of censoring. We deal primarily with right censoring in this thesis.
With the presence of censoring, we introduce the notion of censored data. Let
Ti and Ci be the survival time and censoring time for ith individual, respectively.
The observations are the observed times Yi = Ti ^ Ci and censoring indicators
i = 1(TiCi).
The classical method to estimate the survival function of the failure time non-
parametrically is the Kaplan-Meier estimator. If we sort the observed failure times
as t1 < t2 < tk and let di and ni denote the number of failures at time ti and
the number of individuals at risk at a time just prior to ti, then the Kaplan-Meier






This was rst derived by Kaplan and Meier (1958) and also referred to as the
product limit estimate of the survivor function.
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A related method to estimate the cumulative hazard function non-parametrically






3.1.2 Cox Model and Partial Likelihood
The present thesis focuses on a parametric regression problem instead. In this
regression setting, in addition to Yi and i, we also observe covariates Xi. By
regression modeling, we mean to relate failure time Ti to a covariate specic hazard
function. In this connection, the most commonly used statistical model is the well-
known Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). If Xi represents treatment
assignment, the Cox model species that the treatment has a multiplicative eect
on the subject's hazard rate. For example, a drug may halve one's immediate
probability of stroke. This is in contrast to additive hazards models, wherein a
treatment may increase one's hazard by a xed amount which is independent of
baseline.
We can consider the Cox model as consisting of two parts: the baseline hazard
function, often denoted by 0(t), describing how hazard (risk) changes over time at
`baseline' levels of covariates; and the eect parameters, describing how the hazard
varies in response to explanatory covariates. A typical medical example would
include as covariates, treatment assignment as well as patient characteristics to
reduce variability and/or control for confounding.
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Let (tjx) be the hazard function when the covariate X = x, which can be
multi-dimensional. The Cox model takes the form
(tjx) = ex0(t); (3.6)
where 0(t) is the baseline hazard rate. Treatment is a dichotomous variable in-
cluded in x and its corresponding coecient  is called the `treatment eect'.
Suppose there are n independent subjects, each associated with a p1 vector of
covariates Xi = (xi1; : : : ; xip)
0 (1  i  n). Let Ti and Ci be the survival time and
censoring time of the ith subject respectively. We assume that f(Ti; Ci; Xi); 1 
i  ng are independent and identically distributed; also that the fTig and fCig
are conditionally independent of each other, given the fXig. We observe pairs
(Y1; 1); : : : ; (Yn; n), where Yi = Ti ^ Ci and i = 1(TiCi). So the data consist of n
triplets f(Yi; i; Xi); 1  i  ng.
Sir David Cox observed that if the proportional hazards assumption holds (or,
is assumed to hold) then it is possible to estimate the eect parameter(s) without
any consideration of the baseline hazard function. In other words, the Cox model









Here R(t) is the set of individuals at risk of failure at time t . An estimator of the
treatment eect ^ can be obtained by maximizing the partial likelihood function
L().
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Following the estimated ^, the baseline hazard function can also be estimated
by applying the Nelson-Aalen estimator ^(t) =
R t
0
d^0(u), where d^0(u) is 0 except








In the simplest case of stationary coecients, for example, a treatment with a
drug may, say, halve a subject's hazard at any given time t, while the baseline hazard
may vary. Note however, that the covariate is not restricted to binary predictors.
In the case of a continuous covariate x, the hazard responds logarithmically; each
unit increase in x results in proportional scaling of the hazard. Typically under the
fully-general Cox model, the baseline hazard is \integrated out", or heuristically
removed from consideration, and the remaining partial likelihood is maximized.
The eect of covariates estimated by any proportional hazards model can thus be
reported as hazard ratios.
3.1.3 Lag Eect and Changepoint
In survival analysis, it is often not unreasonable to assume that a treatment
eect does not aect the risk of failure until after a certain time lag, which is
quite common in clinical trials for disease prevention or treatment. Zucker and
Lakatos (1990) described several such situations. There is also the possibility of a
\saturation eect", where the treatment stops to aect the risk of failure after a
certain period of time.
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We will consider a simple way to characterize the lag eect. It means that
the treatment eect stays at zero until a thresholding time, at which it takes on a
nonzero value. This means that the hazard rate takes a jump (or dive) at that time.
So the statistical problem of interest would be to test whether such a threshold
or `changepoint' exists, and to estimate the location of the changepoint and the
treatment eect before and after the changepoint. The treatment eect is initially
zero by assumption in this case. Such knowledge would be of great value in relevant
clinical trials.
Mathematically, it is very natural to extend the problem to the `saturation eect'
where the treatment eect changes from nonzero to zero at a certain threshold,
or situations where the treatment eect is not necessarily zero at the beginning,
but just takes a jump of a certain magnitude at the changepoint. We can also
generalize to multiple changepoints so that such jump could take place multiple
times throughout the whole time period of interest.
In statistical literatures, in terms of hypothesis testing, Zucker and Lakatos
(1990) studied two-sample weighted logrank statistics for comparing survival curves
that are robust against a class of unknown treatment lag eects. Liang, Self, and
Liu (1990) presented a modication of the Cox (1972) proportional hazards model
to include a changepoint. They proposed a test of the null hypothesis that there
is no changepoint based on the maximal score statistic. Luo, Turnbull, and Clark
(1997) used the same model and proposed a partial likelihood ratio test for testing
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the hypothesis that the changepoint is equal to a given value.
For estimation of lag eects, Luo et al. (1994) and Luo (1996) used the max-
imum partial likelihood estimators and obtained the asymptotic distributions for
the estimators of the changepoint and regression coecients.
Luo's model (1994, 1996, 1997) is a simple extension of the Cox proportional
hazards model. Their testing and estimation methodologies are for the most part
standard likelihood-based methods such as the likelihood ratio test and the maxi-
mum (partial) likelihood estimator. Unlike in the standard case, the test statistic
they arrived at is not of a normal distribution. Calculating the p-value would in-
volve simulation of random-walks. See Luo, Turnbull, and Clark (1997) for details.
Their maximum likelihood estimator of the changepoint does not have a standard
asymptotic distribution either. See Luo (1996) for more discussion.
In this part of the thesis, we consider a model similar to the one used by Liang et
al. (1990) and Luo et al. (1994), with the multiple changepoint detection technique
developed by Lai and Xing (2011). The next section gives a brief introduction to
the modeling techniques of changepoint problems.
3.1.4 Changepoint Modeling
In general, the changepoint problems in statistics are based on a series of inde-
pendent observations from the family of distributions fi where the i are unknown
parameters that are piecewise constant. The problems of interest are the testing
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and estimation of the parameter values and the changepoints (where the parameter
changes value).
There is an extensive literature on the case where i can undergo at most one
change, both from the frequentist approach (e.g., Hinkley, 1970) and the Bayesian
approach (e.g., Carlin, Gelfand, & Smith, 1992). There has been diculty extend-
ing the methodology to the multiple changepoint setting because of the computa-
tional complexity.
From the frequentist perspective, Bai (1997a, 1997b), Bai and Perron (1998,
2003), and Qu and Perron (2007) considered regression models with multiple change-
points, using dynamic programming to compute the least square estimates of the
piecewise constant regression parameters when it is assumed that there are k( 2)
changepoints. An alternative approach that is computationally more convenient
especially when k is not small is the binary segmentation procedure proposed by
Vostrikova (1981) and rened by Olshen et al. (2004). The choice of k for this
approach can be carried out by a model selection criterion by applying Schwartz's
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) as in Yao (1988). Siegmund (2004) and Zhang
and Siegmund (2006) pointed out that the likelihood functions do not satisfy the
regularity conditions of the BIC and proposed modications of the BIC in change-
point problems.
The Bayesian approach to multiple changeponts dates back to the work of Cher-
no and Zacks (1964). McCulloch and Tsay (1993) extended Cherno-Zacks model
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and used the Gibbs sampler to approximate the posterior distribution of the time-
varying parameters. Barry and Hartigan (1992, 1993) proposed a product partition
model as the prior distribution for the sequence of the piecewise constant parame-
ters and used the Gibbs sampler to estimate the posterior means of the parameters.
Subsequent developments of the Bayesian approach typically utilized the reversible
jump Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method by Green (1995), or Gibbs sam-
pling used in conjunction with Metropolis-Hastings steps, such as Liu and Lawrence
(1999), Wang and Zivot (2000) and Chib, Nardari and Shephard (2002). All these
methods assume conjugate priors for the parameters and use simulation-based in-
ference via MCMC algorithms.
Lai and Xing (2011) considers a Bayesian model for multiple changepoints in
a multiparameter exponential family. The model has attractive statistical and
computational properties. It produces explicit recursive formulas for the Bayesian
estimates of the piecewise constant parameters instead of depending on simulation
techniques. Although the approach assumes a parametric model and superim-
poses on it a Bayesian changepoint model, the assumed model is only used as a
working model to derive the Bayesian smoothers and the frequentist segmentation
procedures. Their model is able to tackle both Bayesian and frequentist problems
eciently provides a general methodology for multiple changepoint problems.
In this part, we propose an approach to modeling changepoint problems in
Cox model that is parallel to Lai and Xing (2011) and the procedure shares many
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desirable properties. However, Lai and Xing's model is built under a time series
framework while we are dealing with survival data in this part. There are two major
dierences. Firstly, all observations are made within nite time in our setting.
Secondly, we will have only one observation (failure time) for each individual but




3.2.1.1 Independent and Identically Distributed Case
Following Lai and Xing (2011), we consider a multiparameter exponential family
of densities
f(y) = expf0y    ()g (3.7)
with respect to some measure  on Rd, and the prior density of . fytg (t = 1; : : : ; n)
are independent and indentically distributed (i.i.d.) observations from the densities.
Suppose that, instead of being time-invariant, the parameter vector t may
undergo occasional changes such that for t > 1, the indicator variables
It := 1ft 6=t 1g (3.8)
are independent Bernoulli random variables with P (It = 1) = p, where p stands for
the probability of change. If p = 0, the model reverts back to the time-invariant
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case. Again, this serves only as a working assumption for our derivation under the
Bayesian setup. The procedures and results are not reliant on the assumption.
When there is a parameter change at time t (i.e., It = 1), the changed parameter
t is assumed to be sampled from the same density . In other words, t is a stepwise
constant function with respect to time t and its value jumps at the changepoints.
Consequently, yt will not be identically distributed any more.
3.2.1.2 Time Series Case
To illustrate in a time series setup, we take the simple AR(1) as an example.
We assume yt follows an AR(1) process with no intercept term
yt =   yt 1 + t;
where t > 1 and t is a white noise process with density .
In a conventional time series,  is assumed to be time-invariant. Given it is an
AR(1) process, the likelihood of the time series y1; : : : ; yn can be written as
f(y1; : : : ; yn) = f(ynjyn 1)    f(y2jy1)f(y1)
= (yn   yn 1)   (y2   y1)f(y1): (3.9)
Here, we again assume that t may undergo occasional changes such that for
t > 1, the indicator variables
It := 1ft 6=t 1g (3.10)
are independent Bernoulli random variables with P (It = 1) = p.
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The AR(1) process becomes yt = t 1  yt 1 + t. Consequently, the likelihood
expression becomes
f(y1; : : : ; yn) = f(ynjyn 1)    f(y2jy1)f(y1)
= (yn   t 1yn 1)   (y2   1y1)f(y1): (3.11)
3.2.1.3 Changepoint Model on Exponential Family and Conjugate Prior
Consider a multiparameter exponential family of densities
f(y) = expf0y    ()g (3.12)
with respect to some measure  on Rd, and the prior density of  on  := f :R
e
0yd(y) <1g given by
(; a0; 0) = c(a0; 0)expfa000   a0 ()g;  2 ; (3.13)
where 1=c(a0; 0) =
R

expfa000   a0 ()gd and 0 2 (r )(), in which r
denotes the gradient vector of partial derivatives. The posterior density of  given










see Diaconis and Ylvisaker (1979). Thus, (3.13) is a conjugate family of priors and
Z

f(y)(; a; )d =
c(a; )
c(a+ 1; (a+ y)=(a+ 1))
: (3.15)
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As before, we assume that the parameter vector t may undergo occasional
changes such that for t > 1, the indicator variables
It := 1ft 6=t 1g (3.16)
are independent Bernoulli random variables with P (It = 1) = p. When there is a
parameter change at time t (i.e., It = 1), the changed parameter t is assumed to
be sampled from .
The simplicity of the conjugate priors allows for explicit formulas for the sequen-
tial (ltering) estimates E(tjY1;t) and for the xed-sample (smoothing) estimates
E(tjY1;n), where t = r (t) and Yi;j denotes (yi; : : : ; yj) for i  j.
An important ingredient in the development of these explicit formulas is the
most recent changepoint Rt up to time t, i.e., Rt = maxfs  t : Is = 1g. In other
words, Rt is the last changepoint on or before t, implying that there are no other
changepoints between Kt and t and all observations between the two points share
the same parameter .




pitf(tjYi;t; Kt = i): (3.17)
Here Y1;t can be replaced by Yi;t on the right-hand side because observations before
the most recent changepoint do not carry information about the current parameter
t.
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Given Rt = i, Yi;t = (yi; : : : ; yt) are consecutive observations sharing the same
parameter t. It follows from (3.14) that
f(tjYi;t; Rt = i) = (t; a0 + t  i+ 1; Yi;t); (3.18)
where Yi;t = (a00+
Pj





pit(t; a0 + t  i+ 1; Yi;t): (3.19)
A recursive formula for pit can be obtained by noting that
Pt
i=1 pit = 1 and
pit / pit :=
8>>><>>>:
pf(ytjIt = 1) if i = t;
(1  p)pi;t 1f(ytjYi;t 1; Kt = i) if i  t  1:
(3.20)
Plugging in f(ytjYi;t 1; Kt = i) =
R
ft(yt)f(tjYi;t 1; Kt = i)dt together with





if i = t;
(1  p)pi;t 1i;t 1
i;t
if i  t  1;
(3.21)
where 0;0 := c(a0; 0) and i;j := c(a0 + j   i+ 1; Yi;j).
To derive E(tjY1;n), we utilize Bayes Theorem to combine the forward lter
tjYt and the backward lter tjYt+1;n. The backward lter is obtained by reversing
time, noting that the eIt = 1ft 6=t+1g are still independent Bernoulli. We dene the
very next changepoint as the time-reversed counterpart of Rt, eRt := minfs > t :
eIs = 1g and qt+1;j = P ( eRt = jjYt).
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The backward (time-reversed) lter can be expressed as
f(tjYt+1;n) = p(t; a0; 0) + (1  p)
nX
j=t+1
qj;t+1(t; a0 + j   t; Yt+1;j); (3.22)
where qjt / qjt,
Pn





if j = t;
(1  p)qj;t+1t+1;j
tj






Combining the backward lter (3.22) with the forward lter (3.19), and noting that






(; a0 + j   i+ 1; Yi;j);




ijt(t; a0 + j   i+ 1; Yi;j); (3.25)
where ijt = 








ppit if i  t = j;
(1  p)pitqj;t+1itt+1;j
ij00
if i  t < j:
(3.26)
It follows from (3.26) that







3.2.2 Cox Model with Changepoints
The changepoint problem in survival analysis, specically in Cox model shares
many similarities with the general changepoint problem. However, a major dier-
ence conceptually is the fact that the changepoint is not modeled on the response
variable \time" directly as in most other models. Instead, changepoint is modeled
on the hazard function, which is an instantaneous rate of the event (or failure) hap-
pening. Thus, the changepoint aects time indirectly through the hazard function.
In other words, we will make the assumption that the coecient  in Cox model
may undergo occasional changes and is a piecewise constant function with respect
to time.
Another important dierence comes from the fact that Cox model is a semi-
parametric models. Instead of the full likelihood, we have to rely on the partial
likelihood for inference of the coecient. In order to be analogous to the general
method, we rst introduce a segmentation of the time axis 0 < t1 < : : : < tj <
: : : < tk < : : : < tK < 1. We assume that the coecient stays constant within
each time segment [tj; tj+1]; 1  j < K so that change could only occur on a nite
number of time points.
Under the standard setup of Cox model, suppose there are n independent sub-
jects, each associated with a p  1 vector of covariates Xi = (xi1; : : : ; xip)0 (1 
i  n). Let Ti and Ci be the survival time and censoring time of the ith subject,
90
respectively. We assume that f(Ti; Ci; Xi); 1  i  ng are independent and identi-
cally distributed; also that the fTig and fCig are conditionally independent of each
other, given the fXig. We observe pairs (Y1; 1); : : : ; (Yn; n), where Yi = Ti ^ Ci
and i = 1(TiCi). So the data consist of n triplets f(Yi; i; Xi); 1  i  ng.
With respect to the time segmentation, we here dene Yjk as the set of failure
time observations made between tj and tk:
Yjk = f Yi j Yi 2 [tj; tk]; i = 1 g (3.28)
Note that in general, there could be multiple failure times within each segment, or
there could be zero failure time with each segment.
As a result, for time segment [tj; tk], we have partial likelihood within the seg-













As the usual notation in Cox models, Ri = fi0jYi0  Yig denotes the risk set at
time Yi, meaning all the subjects at risk at failure time Yi; x(t) = e
x0(t) is
the hazard function for a subject with covariate X = x. Here 0(t) is an arbitrary
unknown baseline hazard function. Intuitively, f(Yjkj) is the product of the partial
likelihood terms for every failure time between tj and tk.
As discussed before, to accommodate for the existence of changepoints, we now
make the assumption that  is not time-invariant and may undergo occasional
changes. The proportional hazards model with time-varying coecient has the
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form
(tjx) = e(t)x0(t): (3.30)
(t) denotes the regression coecient that is time dependent. (Following the
Bayesian setup in Lai et al. (2005), we assume that (t) forms a variant of com-
pound poisson process with rate r:
(t) := DN(t) (3.31)
fN(t); t  0g is a Poisson process with rate r, and fDi; i  0g are i.i.d. random
variables with known distribution , which are also independent of fN(t); t  0g.)
Please note that the Bayesian setup in this section allows a simple algorithm
to be developed, but the results will not be dependent on the Bayesian setup. As
shown later in the section, the results will have frequentist interpretations as well
as Bayesian interpretations.
For notation simplicity, when there is no ambiguity, we will use the notations
k and Ik as follows
k = (tk); Ik = 1fk 6=k 1g:
As a result, P (Ik = 1) = P (k 6= k 1) = 1   e r(tk tk 1). By utilizing the most
recent changepoint Rk = fjjj  k; Ij = 1g, we can derive the posterior distribution




P (Rk = jjY1k)f(kjRk = j; Y1k) =
kX
j=1




pjk / pjk =
8>>><>>>:
pkfkk if j = k;
(1  pk)pj;k 1 fjk
fj;k 1
if j < k;
(3.33)
where





Cjk = fIj = 1; Ij+1 = 0;    Ik = 0; Ik+1 = 1g: (3.35)
Similarly, by utilizing the very next changepoint eRk = fljl > k; eIl = 1g where









qk+1;lf(k+1j eRk = l; Yk+1;K) (3.36)
and
qk+1;l / qk+1;l =
8>>><>>>:
pk+1fk+1;k+1 if l = k + 1
(1  pk+1)qk+2;l fk+1;l
fk+2;l
if l > k + 1:
(3.37)
Combining the forward and backward lters gives us the posterior distribution
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of each k given the whole set of observations Y1K (smoother):
f(kjY1K) / f(kjY1k)f(kjYk+1;K)=(k)










Here f(kjY1K ; Cjk) and f(kjY1K ; Cjl) can be easily calculated because they
are essentially posterior distributions of k given a portion of the data without
changepoint. In the same way, the posterior changepoint probability bpk+1 at each






If one single changepoint is assumed, this model is equivalent to the lag model
used by Luo et al. (1996, 1997). However, our model is more general in the
sense that the number of changpoints is not pre-specied in the model. With the
procedure described below, all of the existing changepoints will be detected.
As in Lai et al. (2005), by utilizing the most recent change-time, we can get the
forward lter, backward lter, then the posterior distribution for It and (t); t =
t1; : : : ; tK . The key thing to note here is that in fjk =
R1
 1 f(Yjkj)()d, because
of the nonparametric term 0(t) in our model, we cannot write out the full likelihood














The previous discussion is based on \Fixed Segmentation" where the segmen-
tation points are pre-determined. Given all the observations Yi, we can dene
the \Natural Segmentation", which is using all the failure times to segment the
time axis instead of arbitrary time points. Thus, the segmentation points are
ftjg = fYiji = 1g. Consequently, there is only one failure time in each segment.
The \Natural Segmentation" is the nest segmentation possible for inference on
, for the reason that there is no information about the coecient between two
adjacent failure times.
One of the major dierences between this Cox model with Changepoints and
the Changepoint Model in the previous section is the fact that there is no conjugate
prior for the partial likelihood in the Cox model. As a result, there is no explicit
formula for the integrals fij as in (3.34) and they have to be carried out numerically
in general. If a normal prior is assumed, one way to carry out the numerical
integration is techniques such as Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
Under normal prior, we can also utilize quadratic approximation to avoid the
need of numerical integration. If there are enough observations between i and j,
we can perform a quadratic expansion of the partial likelihood function around the
estimator ^ as follows:
f(Yjkj) = e 12 ( ^)0J(^)( ^); (3.41)
where J() is the Fisher information matrix and ^ is the maximum partial likeli-
hood estimator. Inserting (3.41) back into (3.34) gives the marginal likelihood as
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integration of the product of two normal densities:







which yields an explicit formula as the general case in the previous section.
3.2.3 Estimation Procedure
3.2.3.1 Fixed Segmentation and Natural Segmentation
If prior knowledge is available with respect to the location of changepoints, or if
changepoints can only occur at a number of time points due to certain experimental
designs, the \Fixed Segmentation" is recommended for changepoint detection.
For example, if it was known that a certain drug has a lag eect of 3-6 months
and a saturation eect after 5-6 years, the the segmentation can be set up on xed
time points such as (3 month, 4 month, 5 month, 6 month, 5 years, 5.25 years, 5.5
years, 6 years) and the one changepoint can be identied for each eect.
It will be shown in the next chapter theoretically that the changepoints identied
in this setup has nice asymptotic properties.
If no prior knowledge of the changepoints is present, the recommended method
is the \Natural Segmentation". It is the nest segmentation possible with the data
given, and as shown by simulation studies afterwards, it can detect changepoints
eectively when the sample size is reasonably large.
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3.2.3.2 Single Changepoint
If it is assumed that there is only one changepoint, the estimation procedure for
the changepoint kc is then simply nding the point with the maximum posterior
changepoint probability:
fkc : p^kc = max
1kK
(p^k)g:
As will be shown in the next chapter, the posterior changepoint probability on
the true changepoint converges to 1, while the probability on other points converges
to 0. As a result, this procedure will always nd the true changepoint asymptoti-
cally.
3.2.3.3 Multiple Changepoints
If multiple changepoints are assumed, one has to set a cuto threshold for pos-
terior changepoint probability, for example, 0:5. Any point with p^k above the
threshold is identied as a changepoint. With the asymptotic properties, true
changepoints will be identied given enough observations.
However, in applications such as the lag eect and saturation eect in the exam-
ple above, the changepoints often have direct scientic interpretations, resulting in
more ecient ways of identifying the changepoints. In the lag eect and saturation
eect example above, the procedure will be to identify one changepoint indentied
between 3 to 6 months, another one between 5 to 6 years.
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3.2.3.4 Estimation of 
There are two ways to estimate . The Bayesian estimate would be the posterior
mean as shown in (3.38), which yields a  estimate for each time point. An abrupt
change in the estimate can be observed where a changepoint is most likely.
The other way to estimate ^ is from the frequentist perspective after the change-
points are identied. For example, if one changepoints is identied, the change-
points will partition the data into two sections. The maximum partial likelihood
estimator of each section ^1 and ^2 will be the estimate coecient for each section.
3.3 Proof of Consistency
We will prove the consistency of the changepoint estimates of the Cox model
under the \Fixed Segmentation" setup in the chapter. It will be shown that as the
number of observations goes to innity, the posterior changepoint probabilities p^k on
the true changepoints converge to 1, while the posterior changepoint probabilities
on non-changepoints converge to 0.
We will start by looking at the single changepoint scenario and the generalize
to the scenario of multiple changepoints.
3.3.1 Single Changepoint
Following the \xed segmentation", We segment time into intervals of [0; t1],
[t1; t2],...,[tm 1; tm], and assume tkc+1 (0 < kc < m) is the true changepoint in terms
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of the parameter of interest . Let fYi;1; i = 1; 2:::ng denote the n observations
made between [0; t1]. Let fYi;k; i = 1; 2:::ng denote the n observations made between
[tk 1; tk] for 1  k  m.
Suppose Yi;1; :::; Yi;kc (i = 1; 2:::n) are i.i.d. random variables that follow distri-
bution function F (1), while Yi;kc+1; :::Yi;m (i = 1; 2:::n) are i.i.d. random variables
that follow distribution function F (2). If 1 6= 2, then tk1+1 is the only change-
point. Otherwise, there is no changepoint. Without loss of generosity, the prior on
changepoint probability is assumed to be p uniformly.








pjk / pjk =
8>>><>>>:





qk+1;l / qk+1;l =
8>>><>>>:
pk+1fk+1;k+1 l = k + 1;
(1  pk+1)qk+2;l fk+1;l
fk+2;l
l > k + 1;
(3.45)
and




Lemma 1. If Ij = Ij+1 = : : : = Il = 0, then as n ! 1, fjlfjkfk+1;l ! 1, for all
j; k; l where j  k < l.
99
The interpretation of this lemma is that if no changepoint is present between j
and l, then for any k between j and l, the ratio between the density fjl based on a
uniform  and the density product fjkfk+1;l based on two dierent 's will converge
to innity as the number of observations increases.





















i=1 f(Yi) and expand-


























n(l   j + 1) : (3.49)
Combining the three terms together, we get
fjl
fjkfk+1;l
 pnelog(fjk(^jl)) log(fjk(^jk))  elog(fk+1;l(^jl)) log(fk+1;l(^k+1;l)): (3.50)
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n); when n!1: (3.51)
Lemma 2. If Ij = Ij+1 = : : : = Ik = 0, Ik+1 = 1 and Ik+2 = : : : = Il = 0 then as
n!1, fjl
fjkfk+1;l
! 0, for all j; l where j  k < l.
Lemma 2 is the opposite of Lemma 1. It states that if k + 1 is the only
changepoint between j and l, then the ratio between the density fjl based on a
uniform  and the density product fjkfk+1;l based on the correct changepoint of 
will converge to zero as the number of observations increases.
Proof of Lemma 2
Following the same steps of proving Lemma 1,
fjl
fjkfk+1;l
 pnelog(fjk(^jl)) log(fjk(^jk))  elog(fk+1;l(^jl)) log(fk+1;l(^k+1;l)): (3.52)
Because k + 1 is the only changepoint between j and l,
log(fjk(^jl))  log(fjk(^jk)) < 0





ne n)! 0; when n!1: (3.53)
Lemma 3. If Ij = 1 and Ij+1 = : : : = Ik = 0 then as n!1, pjk ! 1, for all j; k
where j  k.
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Lemma 3 states that if j is a changepoint and there is no other changepoint
between j and k, then the probability of j being the most recent changepoint of k
converges to 1 as the number of observations increases.
Proof of Lemma 3
(a) Because kc is the only changepoint, based on Lemma 2 we have
fj;kc+1
fjkcfkc+1;kc+1
! 0; for all j  kc: (3.54)
Inserting this into the expression of pkc+1;kc+1, we get
pkc+1;kc+1 =
p
p+ (1  p)Pjkc pj;kc fj;kc+1fj;kcfkc+1;kc+1 ! 1 (3.55)
when n!1.
(b) Assume we have pkc+1;k ! 1 for k  kc+1, we would like to prove pkc+1;k+1 !
1. Given pkc+1;k ! 1 and
P
j<=k pjk = 1, we have































Ajk s O(1); for all j > kc + 1 (3.60)
and
Ajk ! 0; for all j < kc + 1: (3.61)
Combining (3.56), (3.58), (3.59), (3.60), (3.61) with (3.57) yields pkc+1;k+1 ! 1.
Combining (a) and (b), we have proven Lemma 3.
Symmetrically, the same property holds for the very next changepoint: If l + 1
is a changepoint and no other changepoint exists between k + 1 and l, then the
probability of l + 1 being the most recent changepoint of k + 1 converges to 1 as
the number of observations increases.
Lemma 4. If eIl = 1 and eIk = : : : = eIl 1 = 0 then as n ! 1, qk+1;l ! 1, for all
k; l where l  k + 1.
Following Lemma 3 and also the facts that
Pk
j=1 pjk = 1, we get the corollary
that if there exists a changepoint before k and j  k is not a changepoint, then
the probability of j being the most recent changepoint of k converges to 0 as the
number of observations increases.
Corollary 1 If Ij0 = 1 and Ij = 0, then as n ! 1, pjk ! 0, for all j; k where
j  k and j0  k.
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Likewise, if there exists a changepoint after k and l + 1 is not a changepoint,
then the probability of l+1 being the very next changepoint of k converges to 0 as
the number of observations increases.
Corollary 2 If eIl0 = 1 and eIl = 0, then as n ! 1, qk+1;l ! 0, for all k; l where
l  k + 1 and l0  k + 1.
3.3.1.1 No Changepoint
Theorem 1. If I2 = : : : = Im = 0, then as n ! 1, p^k+1 ! 0 for all k =
1; : : : ;m  1.
Proof of Theorem 1




for all j; k; l where 1  j  k < l  m. Combining this with (3.43) yields p^k+1 ! 0
for all k = 1; : : : ;m  1.
3.3.1.2 One Changepoint
Theorem 2. If I2 = : : : = Ikc = 0, Ikc+1 = 1 and Ikc+2 = : : : = Im = 0, then as
n!1, (1) p^kc+1 ! 1; (2) p^k+1 ! 0 for all k = 1; : : : ;m  1 and k 6= kc.
Theorem 2 states the fact that if there is one single changepoint kc + 1, the
posterior changepoint probability p^k+1 on the changepoint converges to 1 while the
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posterior changepoint probability on other time points converges to zero.
Proof of Theorem 2




for all j; l where j  k < l. Combining this with (3.43) yields p^kc+1 ! 1.
(2) Assume k > kc without loss of generality. Given the fact that there is no




for all l > k.
Given the fact that kc + 1 is indeed the most recent changepoint prior to k and
according to Lemma 3, we get
pkc+1;k ! 1: (3.63)











Plugging the above result into (3.43) yields p^k+1 ! 0.
Symmetrically, the same argument can be made for k < kc using Lemma 4.
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3.4 Simulation Studies
In this section, some simulation studies are done to show the performance of the
proposed Cox model changepoint method under a number of dierent scenarios. A
test of robustness is also performed to see how the method works when the actual
change is gradual instead of abrupt.
In general, the failure times are generated using the following property:
Property. If T is a failure time whose cumulative hazard function is (), then
the random variable (T ) follows the exponential distribution with parameter 1.
Hence, any failure time with a known hazard function, as in the Cox model,
can be generated by applying the inverse cumulative hazard function on an exp(1)
random variable.
3.4.1 Fixed Segmentation
In this subsection, we consider the case where (t) has one single changepoint.
We examine whether the changepoint procedure could consistently identify the cor-
rect changepoint location. The xed segmentation method is used in this subsection
with the length of segments being 0.1.
Unless otherwise specied, all simulation results reported in this section are
based on 1000 replications.
In the rst series of simulations, the single covariate X is generated from a
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Table 3.1: One changepoint with Bernoulli covariate, xed segmentation.
Sample Size Eective Sample Size Correct Incorrect
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 59 592 408
300 176 863 137
500 293 905 95
Constant baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 67 806 194
300 202 917 83
500 337 951 49
Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 68 759 241
300 204 943 57
500 339 972 28
Linear baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 89 894 106
300 267 960 40
500 444 985 15
Bernoulli distribution with p = 0:5. The changepoint is at t = 4 with (t) = 0
if t  4 and (t) = 2 if t > 4. Three dierent sample sizes are considered: a)
100, b) 300 and c) 500. Two types of baseline hazard function are included: a)
constant 0(t) = 0:1 and b) linear with respect to time 0(t) = 0:087t. Two types
of censoring are considered: a) exponential with parameter 10, C  exp(10) and
b) uniform between 3 and 8, C  unif(3; 8). The combinations result in a total of
12 cases considered.
Table 3.1 reports the \eective sample size", meaning the number of failure
times excluding censored observations, the number of replications in which the
changepoint estimate is in the correct segment and the number of replications the
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Table 3.2: One changepoint with normal covariate, xed segmentation.
Sample Size Eective Sample Size Correct Incorrect
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 50 735 265
300 150 953 47
500 250 990 10
Constant baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 56 853 147
300 169 986 14
500 281 996 4
Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 62 882 118
300 187 989 11
500 311 1000 0
Linear baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 76 962 38
300 229 1000 0
500 382 1000 0
estimate is in an incorrect segment. It can be observed that when sample size
is only 100 and heavy censoring exists, the percentage of the procedure correctly
identifying the changepoint segment can be as low as 60%. Under milder censoring,
or when sample size is 500, the percentage of correct identication rises to 95% and
above.
In the second series of simulations, we consider a covariate X following the
standard normal distribution. The changepoint is still at 4 and  still changes from
0 to 2. The combinations of sample size, baseline hazard and censoring are also
kept the same.
The results in Table 3.2 are quite similar to Table 3.1. The identication power
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of the procedure is even better under a normal covariate, hence increasing the
percentage of correct identication to close to 100% in some cases.
3.4.2 One Changepoint
In this subsection, we consider the case where the true (t) has one single
changepoint. We examine whether the changepoint procedure could consistently
identify the correct changepoint location and consequently the eect  before and
after the changepoint. The natural segmentation is used in this subsection, meaning
the time axis is segmented by observed failure times.
3.4.2.1 Number of Changepoints Known
We rst examine the scenario where the number of changepoints is known. In
this case, the procedure is obviously to identify the time point with the greatest
posterior changepoint probability as the changepoint estimate.
In the rst series of simulations, the single covariate X is generated from a
Bernoulli distribution with p = 0:5. The changepoint is at t = 4 with (t) = 0
if t  4 and (t) = 2 if t > 4. Three dierent sample sizes are considered: a)
100, b) 300 and c) 500. Two types of baseline hazard function are included: a)
constant 0(t) = 0:1 and b) linear with respect to time 0(t) = 0:087t. Two types
of censoring are considered: a) exponential with parameter 10, C  exp(10) and
b) uniform between 3 and 8, C  unif(3; 8). The combinations result in a total of
12 cases considered.
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Table 3.3: One changepoint with Bernoulli covariate, natural segmentation.
Sample Eective Changepoint ^1 ^2
Size Sample Size Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 59 3.3148 8.1935 0.0259 0.6604 0.5786 6.2543
300 176 -0.0629 1.2555 -0.0292 0.2376 -0.0174 0.3040
500 293 -0.0764 0.2155 -0.0098 0.1747 -0.0111 0.2116
Constant baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 67 -0.3143 0.8546 -0.0969 0.4360 0.1678 3.0752
300 202 -0.1275 0.3180 -0.0261 0.2140 -0.0217 0.2664
500 337 -0.0611 0.1640 -0.0111 0.1574 -0.0123 0.1907
Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 68 0.6395 2.4251 -0.0254 0.5425 0.1122 4.3991
300 204 -0.0700 0.1931 -0.0243 0.1992 -0.0294 0.3107
500 339 -0.0392 0.1050 -0.0212 0.1581 -0.0060 0.2184
Linear baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 89 -0.1628 0.6218 -0.0764 0.3562 -0.0278 1.3349
300 267 -0.0461 0.1407 -0.0140 0.1792 -0.0205 0.2269
500 444 -0.0255 0.0728 -0.0174 0.1349 0.0105 0.1754
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Table 3.3 reports the eective sample size, bias and root mean square error
(RMSE) of changepoint and  estimates of each case considered. When the sample
size is small (100), the eective sample size is even smaller because of censoring,
it can be seen that there are certain replications out of the total of 1000 that
produce results that are outliers, which result in relatively large bias and RMSE
reported. In other words, under a small sample size, there could be situations that
the changepoint cannot be identied or correctly identied. There is a signicant
improvement when the sample size increases to 300 and even better result when it
goes to 500. On the other hand, the method seems to work well under both baseline
hazard functions and both types of censoring.
In the second series of simulations, we consider a covariate X following the
standard normal distribution. The changepoint is still at 4 and  still changes from
0 to 2. The combinations of sample size, baseline hazard and censoring are also
kept the same.
The changepoint method is shown to work well in Table 3.4. Outliers can still
be observed when sample size is at 100, but with less frequency, as evidenced by
smaller bias and RMSE. Also in general, bias and RMSE reported in Table 3.4
are noticeably better compared to their counterparts in Table 3.3. This is because
the covariate in Table 3.4, being normally distributed, has a much wider dispersion
than the Bernoulli covariate in Table 3.3.
In the third series of simulations, dierent true changepoint locations are tested
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Table 3.4: One changepoint with normal covariate, natural segmentation.
Sample Eective Changepoint ^1 ^2
Size Sample Size Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 50 0.5149 4.3480 -0.0090 0.2420 0.8870 12.7320
300 150 -0.0117 0.0813 -0.0043 0.1108 -0.0655 0.2280
500 250 -0.0083 0.0545 -0.0044 0.0879 0.0184 0.1689
Constant baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 56 -0.0477 0.2636 -0.0126 0.1933 -0.1744 0.3684
300 169 -0.0114 0.0654 -0.0023 0.1024 -0.0642 0.1987
500 281 -0.0046 0.0331 0.0017 0.0806 -0.0371 0.1528
Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 62 0.2542 2.6838 -0.0099 0.1954 0.7323 11.9094
300 187 -0.0070 0.0397 -0.0051 0.1013 -0.0630 0.2137
500 311 -0.0027 0.0194 -0.0026 0.0757 -0.0482 0.1625
Linear baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 76 -0.0268 0.1269 -0.0078 0.1564 -0.1525 0.3494
300 229 -0.0034 0.0224 0.0027 0.0896 -0.0480 0.1910
500 382 -0.0027 0.0155 0.0037 0.0664 -0.0342 0.1415
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Table 3.5: Varying changepoint locations.
Changepoint Eective Changepoint Estimate ^1 ^2
Location Sample Size Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
4 250 -0.0083 0.0545 -0.0044 0.0879 0.0184 0.1689
2 250 -0.0040 0.0331 -0.0040 0.1159 0.0069 0.1394
8 250 -0.0201 0.1178 -0.0040 0.0731 0.0372 0.2700
and compared against each other. Three dierent locations are used: a) 4, b) 2,
c) 8. In all cases,  changes from 0 to 2. Sample size is xed at 500 here and
the covariate is normally distributed. The baseline hazard rate is constant and
censoring follows the exp(10) distribution.
Since the only dierence between the three cases is the location of the change-
point, one can see in Table 3.5 that they share the same eective sample size. In
other words, about 50% of observations are censored in each case. In terms of
the estimation of 1, RMSE is smallest when the changepoint is at time 8 and
largest when changepoint is at 2. Conversely, the RMSE of 2 is smallest when
the changepoint is at time 2 and largest at time 8. Both of these are intuitive
trends since the more observations one has for a segment, the better the estimation
of the parameter will be. The interesting fact to notice is that the RMSE of the
changepoint estimate is smallest when the changepoint is at time 2, which coincides
with the case where the RMSE's of 1 and 2 are the closest to each other among
the three cases studied. Conceptually, this suggests that a changepoint can be best
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Table 3.6: Varying degrees of censoring.
Eective Changepoint Estimate ^1 ^2
Censoring Sample Size Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
exp(10) 250 -0.0083 0.0545 -0.0044 0.0879 0.0184 0.1689
exp(5) 176 -0.0180 0.0918 -0.0029 0.0949 -0.0701 0.2269
exp(20) 316 -0.0050 0.0392 -0.0012 0.0844 -0.0249 0.1363
identied when there is about equal information of the parameter before and after
the change.
In the fourth series of simulations, dierent censoring distributions are tested
and compared against each other. The three cases studied are all exponential
distribution with dierent parameters: a) 10, b) 5, c) 20, hence case b) has the
heaviest censoring, case c) the lightest and a) in the middle. Sample size is xed
at 500 here and the covariate is normally distributed. The baseline hazard rate is
constant and the changepoint is at time 4 with  jumping from 0 to 2.
As displayed in Table 3.6 we have an eective sample size of 250 in case a), 176
in case b) and 316 in case c), in the order expected. The lighter the censoring, the
better the estimations of the changepoint, 1 and 2 are, which is consistent with
intuition. However, the impact of censoring on ^1 is only marginal compared to ^2.
This is because heavier censoring decreases observed failures after the changepoint
much more than before the changepoint. For example, in case a), on average there
are 137 observations before the changepoint and 112 after. Under heavier censoring
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Table 3.7: Varying scales of change
Eective Changepoint Estimate ^1 ^2
True 2 Sample Size Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
Sample size = 100
2 50 0.5149 4.3480 -0.0090 0.2420 0.8870 12.7320
8 50 -0.0504 0.1867 -0.0144 0.2068 0.2368 2.2915
Sample size = 300
2 150 -0.0117 0.0813 -0.0043 0.1108 -0.0655 0.2280
8 150 -0.0088 0.0365 -0.0053 0.1099 0.0218 0.9043
of case b), the numbers become 116 and 60, respectively. The percentage of decrease
is about 15% before the changepoint and more than 45% after the changepoint.
The fth series of simulations are concentrated on dierent scales of change in .
We study 4 cases, the rst pair with sample size 100 and the second pair 300. Each
pair will be a contrast of one case with  changing from 0 to 2 and another with 
changing from 0 to 8. The changepoint location is xed at 4 in all cases. Intuitively,
sharper change in the parameter of interest should lead to better identication of
the changepoint. The covariate is normally distributed, and the baseline hazard
rate is constant.
Consistent with our intuition, it can be seen in Table 3.7 that the changepoint
estimate improves when 's scale of change becomes greater, regardless of sample
size. The improvement when sample size is only 100 is more noticeable. The
greater scale of change decreases the number of outlier replications. As a result,
the changepoint estimation improves signicantly.
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Table 3.8: One changepoint with number of changepoint unknown.
Sample Size 1 cp 0 cp  2 cp Total
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
100 701 156 143 1000
300 803 71 126 1000
500 866 58 76 1000
Constant baseline hazard, uniform censoring
100 768 92 140 1000
300 852 61 87 1000
500 887 63 50 1000
Note. cp stands for changepoint.
3.4.2.2 Number of Changepoints Unknown
In contrast to previous subsections, in this subsection, we assume that the num-
ber of changepoints is unknown in the simulations while keeping other elements
the same. In order to identify changepoints in this setup, we have to choose a
threshold parameter p^T and an accuracy parameter  . Every time point with the
posterior changepoint probability greater than p^T will be identied as potential
changepoints. All potential changepoints then are rank ordered in descendance
and any points within a distance  to a higher ranked changepoints are eliminated.
The parameters chosen here are p^T = 0:25 and  = 0:05.
Table 3.8 reports the number of replications out of the total of 1000 in which
the changepoint procedure identies 1 changepoint correctly, no changepoint and
greater than or equal to 2 changepoints, respectively. As the sample size increases
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Table 3.9: Zero changepoint with number of changepoint unknown.
Sample Size 0 cp  1 cp Total
 = 0
100 1000 0 1000
300 1000 0 1000
500 999 1 1000
 = 2
100 1000 0 1000
300 1000 0 1000
500 999 1 1000
Note. cp stands for changepoint.
from 100 to 500, the percentage of correct number of changepoints identied in-
creases from 70% to above 85%.
For comparison and benchmarking the eectiveness of the procedure, we also
performed another series of simulations where the true (t) is constant with respect
to time. Ideally, the changepoint procedure should identify zero changepoint in most
situations, thus minimizing what can be regarded as the \type I" error rate. Two
cases are studied here with a)  = 0 in one and b)  = 2 in the other. The same
parameters p^T = 0:25 and  = 0:05 are used for consistency.
Table 3.9 shows that the procedure indeed performs as expected. The chance
of the procedure identifying a changepoint when the true eect has no changepoint
is indeed minimal in all scenarios studied.
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3.4.3 Two Changepoints
In this subsection, we consider the case where the true (t) undergoes two
jumps. We examine whether the changepoint procedure could consistently identify
the correct changepoint location and consequently the eect  before and after the
changepoint. The natural segmentation is used in this subsection, meaning the
time axis is segmented by observed failure times.
3.4.3.1 Number of Changepoints Known
In the rst scenario, we assume the number of changepoints, 2, is known. Hence,
the procedure used is similar to when the number of changepoints is known to be
1. The two time points with the highest posterior changepoint probability are
identied as changepoints provided that they are apart by a distance greater than
 = 0:05.
In this series of simulations, we study two cases: a) constant baseline hazard,
exponential censoring, (t) is piecewise constant (0, -2, 0) with changepoints at
time 2 and 10; b) Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring, (t) is piecewise
constant (0, -2, 0) with changepoints at time 3 and 7.
Table 3.10 reports, out of 1000 replications, the number of replications where cp1
and cp2 are each correctly identied (dened as the estimate in the neighborhood
of the true changepoint), as well as the number of replications where they are both
correctly identied. It can be seen that the percentage of simultaneous correct
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Table 3.10: Two changepoints with number of changepoint known (a).
Sample Size cp1 cp2 Both
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
300 979 902 881
500 975 960 935
Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring
300 977 928 905
500 984 972 956
Note. cp stands for changepoint.
Table 3.11: Two changepoints with number of changepoint known (b).
cp1 cp2
Sample Size Success Rate Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
300 88.1% 0.0078 0.0615 0.0840 0.6742
500 93.5% 0.0040 0.0322 0.0239 0.3468
Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring
300 90.5% 0.0074 0.0473 0.0101 0.2052
500 95.6% 0.0035 0.0267 -0.0242 0.1680
Note. CP stands for changepoint.
identication is around 90% when the sample size is 300 and rises to about 95%
when the sample size is 500.
Table 3.11 reports the success rate (percentage of simultaneous correct iden-
tication) and the bias and RMSE of the two changepoint estimates across all
successful replications.
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Table 3.12: Two changepoints with number of changepoint unknown (a).
Sample Size 2 cp 0 cp 1 cp >2 cp Total
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
300 536 8 202 254 1000
500 599 7 180 214 1000
Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring
300 582 12 209 197 1000
500 636 6 204 154 1000
Note. cp stands for changepoint.
3.4.3.2 Number of Changepoints Unknown
In the rst scenario, we assume the number of changepoints is unknown. Hence,
the procedure used is the same as when the true number of changepoints, 1, is
unknown as in Section 3.4.2.2. The same parameters are also used, p^T = 0:25 and
 = 0:05.
In this series of simulations, we study two cases: a) constant baseline hazard,
exponential censoring, (t) is piecewise constant (0, -2, 0) with changepoints at
time 2 and 10; b) Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring, (t) is piecewise
constant (0, -2, 0) with changepoints at time 3 and 7.
Table 3.12 reports, out of 1000 replications, the number of replications where
the number of changepoints identied is 2 (correct), 0 or 1 (too few) and more
than 2 (too many). It can be seen that the percentage of simultaneous correct
identication is around 55% when the sample size is 300 and rises to about 60%
when the sample size is 500.
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Table 3.13: Two changepoints with number of changepoint unknown (b).
cp1 cp2
Sample Size Success Rate Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
Constant baseline hazard, exponential censoring
300 49.8% 0.0094 0.0565 0.0873 0.4748
500 57.8% 0.0041 0.0333 0.0385 0.3060
Linear baseline hazard, exponential censoring
300 53.7% 0.0086 0.0428 0.0144 0.1797
500 62.9% 0.0044 0.0236 -0.0144 0.1510
Note. cp stands for changepoint.
Table 3.13 reports the success rate (percentage of simultaneous correct iden-
tication) and the bias and RMSE of the two changepoint estimates across all
successful replications. One will notice that the success rates in Table 3.13 are a
bit lower than those in Table 3.12. This is because there are replications where
the correct number of changepoints, 2, is identied but the locations of the two
changepoints are incorrect. A typical example of misidentication would be two
estimated changepoints being both around 7 while the true changepoints are 3 and
7.
3.4.4 A Study of Robustness
So far we have performed simulations under the assumption that the true (t)
does undergo an abrupt change, or a jump. In practice, it is not unreasonable
to assume that (t) actually goes through a continuous or gradual change. For
example, Martinussen and Scheike (2006) studied extensively such models with
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Figure 3.1: Treatment eect steep change












time-varying eects of covariates. Therefore, it would be of interest to test how the
proposed changepoint method performs under such continuous changes.
First, we examine a scenario where (t) undergoes a continuous but steep linear
change between time 3 and 4 and then stays constant as in Figure 3.1. Namely,
(t) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if 0  t < 3;
2(t  3) if 3  t < 4;
2 if t  4:
In the second scenario, (t) undergoes a continuous and gradual change between
time 3 and 10 and then stays constant as in Figure 3.2. Namely,
(t) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if 0  t < 3;
2
7
(t  3) if 3  t < 10;
2 if t  10:
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Figure 3.2: Treatment eect gradual change












Results of the changepoint estimation are displayed in Table 3.14. In the \steep
change" case, the mean of changepoint estimates is 3.4562 and right between 3
and 4. In fact, out of all 1000 replications, 98.5% of them returned a changepoint
estimate in the range of [3; 4]. In the \gradual change" case, the mean of estimated
changepoint is also between 3 and 10. Similarly, 99.4% of all replications returned
a changepoint estimate in the range of [3; 10]. It is worthwhile to note though
that the standard deviation of estimates is 1.2251, much larger than the standard
deviation in the \steep change" case.
To summarize, we have shown that even if (t) goes through a continuous
change, the proposed changepoint method still produces a desirable estimate that
falls within the range of  change around 99% of the time.
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Table 3.14: Treatment eect continuous change.
Changepoint Estimate Percentage of estimate
Mean SD falling in between
 steep change between [3; 4]
3.4562 0.1845 98.50 %
 gradual change between [3; 10]
5.4712 1.2251 99.40 %
Note. SD stands for standard deviation.
3.5 Data Analysis
The real data we analyze in this section is a randomized clinical trial as in
Stablein and Koutrouvelis (1985). The clinical trial followed the survival of two
groups of gastric cancer patients, one group receiving chemotherapy treatment only
and the other receiving both chemotherapy and radiotherapy.
Figure 3.3 displays the Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival probabilities for the
two groups of gastric cancer patients. The crossing of the two survival curves is
a strong indication of crossing hazards, and strongly suggests the possibility of a
changepoint in the hazard of our model.
Both our proposed changepoint procedure and Luo and Turnbull's MLE pro-
cedure are applied to the clinical trial data. Interestingly, they yield basically the
same result: a changepoint is found on the 31st failure time, meaning 262 days.
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 display the result of the two procedures, respectively. The
 estimates before and after the changepoint are 1.4229 and -0.64228 respectively,
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Figure 3.3: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival probabilities
















Figure 3.4: Changepoint procedure estimate









which implies that in the beginning, the hazard for patients receiving both thera-
pies is about 4 times the hazard for those receiving only chemotherapy. However,
for patients who survive after 262 days of chemotherapy and radiotherapy, their
hazard is about half of the hazard for patients in the chemotherapy group.
One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that weaker patients receiving
both chemotherapy and radiotherapy have a very high chance of death before the
262 days because of the strength of the treatment. However, those patients that
are strong enough to survive the rst period of treatment have a better chance of
survival than patients receiving chemotherapy only.
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Figure 3.5: MLE procedure estimate















4.1 Credit Risk Modeling and Analysis Using Cop-
ula Method
The 2007-2009 nancial crisis drew a lot of attention to the securitized products
of residential mortgages. There is plenty of literature analyzing the loss distribu-
tion of securitizations of mortgages (e.g., RMBS) such as the Pykhtin-Dev model,
but there has not been much analyzing the loss distribution of re-securitizations
(e.g., CDO of RMBS). Re-securitizations are treated more or less the same way as
securitizations by the nancial industry.
The rst part of this thesis extended the Pykhtin-Dev model and derived an-
alytically the loss distribution of re-securitizations under the ASRF framework,
highlighting the important dierences between re-securitizations and securitiza-
tions. Applying the model to credit rating of CDO tranches showed why it was
unreasonable for the rating agencies to assign \AAA" ratings to CDOs made out
of mezzanine tranches of subprime RMBS. We also proposed an alternative cor-
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relation structure for the securitization model, the Student's t Copula, instead of
the commonly used Gaussian Copula. It was shown how tail correlation, being the
main advantage of Student's t Copula, aects the loss distribution of securitization
tranches, especially the tail loss.
For future work, it would be of interest to extend the Student's t Copula to
re-securitzations. Computational eciency will be key as the method tends to rely
on Monte Carlo simulations.
4.2 Changepoint Approach to Survival Data
The lag eect and saturation eect problems are common and important prob-
lems in survival analysis. Previous studies of these problems focused on MLE based
methods, such as Luo et al. (1994). They can be considered in fact to belong to
a general class of changepoint problem where the treatment eect takes occasional
jumps instead of staying constant over time. Changepoint problems have been
studied extensively in statistical literatures, such as Lai and Xing (2011).
The second part of this thesis extended Lai and Xing's recent work in change-
point modeling, which was developed under a time series and Bayesian setup, to
the lag eect problems in survival analysis. A general changepoint approach for
Cox models was proposed. The procedure is exible, allowing changepoint esti-
mation with or without knowledge of the number of changepoints. Consistency of
the estimator was proved under the xed segmentation method. An example was
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given to illustrate how the procedure can be applied to clinical trial data to analyze
time-varying treatment eect.
It would be valuable in future research to explore the asymptotic properties of
the procedure under the more practical natural segmentation method. It would
also be of interest to extend the approach possibly to regression models in survival
analysis other than Cox model.
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